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    I think that all these moans and lamentations are not worth a brass farthing. Our organization is not a family circle, nor an association of personal friends; it is the political party of the working class. We cannot allow interests of personal friendship to be placed above the interests of our cause.

    Things have come to a sorry pass, comrades, if the only reason why we are called old Bolsheviks is that we are old. Old Bolsheviks are respected not because they are old, but because they are at the same time eternally fresh, never-aging revolutionaries. If an old Bolshevik swerves from the path of the revolution, or degenerates and fails politically, then, even if he is a hundred years old, he has no right to call himself an old Bolshevik; he has no right to demand that the Party should respect him.

    Further, questions of personal friendship cannot be put on a par with political questions, for, as the saying goes, friendship is all very well, but duty comes first. We all serve the working class, and if the interests of personal friendship clash with the interests of the revolution, then personal friendship must come second. As Bolsheviks we cannot have any other attitude.

    I shall not touch either on the insinuations and veiled accusations of a personal nature that were contained in the speeches of comrades of the Bukharin opposition. Evidently these comrades are attempting to cover up the underlying political basis of our disagreements with insinuations and equivocations. They want to substitute petty political scheming for politics. Tomsky's speech is especially noteworthy in this respect. His was the typical speech of a trade-unionist politician who attempts to substitute petty political scheming for politics. However, that trick of theirs won't work.

    Let us get down to business.

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    Have we a single, common, general line or have we two lines? That, comrades, is the basic question.

    In his speech here, Rykov said that we have a single general line and that if we do have some "insignificant" disagreements, it is because there are "shades of difference" in the interpretation of the general line.

    Is that correct? Unfortunately, it is not. And it is not merely incorrect, but it is absolutely contrary to the truth. If we really have only one line, and there are only shades of difference between us, then why did Bukharin run off to yesterday's Trotskyites led by Kamenev, in an effort to set up with them a factional bloc directed against the Central Committee and its Political Bureau? Is it not a fact that Bukharin spoke there of a "fatal" line of the Central Committee, of Bukharin's, Tomsky's and Rykov's disagreements in principle with the Central Committee of the Party, of the need for a drastic change in the composition of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee?

    If there is only one line, why did Bukharin conspire with yesterday's Trotskyites against the Central Committee, and why did Rykov and Tomsky aid him in this undertaking?

    If there is only one general line, how can one part of the Political Bureau, which supports the single, common, general line, be allowed to undermine the other part, which supports the same general line?

    Can a policy of such shifts be allowed if we have a single, common, general line?

    If there is only one line, how are we to account for Bukharin's declaration of January 30, which was wholly and solely aimed against the Central Committee and its general line?

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If there is only one line, how are we to account for the declaration of the trio (Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky) of February 9, in which, in a brazen and grossly slanderous manner, they accuse the Party: a) of a policy of military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry, b) of a policy of fostering bureaucracy, and c) of a policy of disintegrating the Comintern?

    Perhaps these declarations are just ancient history? Perhaps it is now considered that these declarations were a mistake? Perhaps Rykov, Bukharin and Tomsky are prepared to take back these undoubtedly mistaken and anti-Party declarations? If that is the case, let them say so frankly and honestly. Then everyone will understand that we have only one line and that there are only shades of difference between us. But, as is evident from the speeches of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky, they would not do that. And not only would they not do that, but they have no intention of repudiating these declarations of theirs in the future, and they state that they adhere to their views as set forth in the declarations.

    Where then is the single, common, general line?

    If there is only one line, and, in the opinion of Bukharin's group, the Party line consists in pursuing a policy of military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry, then do Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky really wish to join us in pursuing this fatal policy, instead of combating it? That is indeed absurd.

    If there is only one line, and, in the opinion of the Bukharin opposition, the Party line consists in fostering bureaucracy, then do Rykov, Bukharin and Tomsky really wish to join us in fostering bureaucracy within the Party, instead of combating it? That is indeed nonsense.

    If there is only one line, and, in the opinion of the Bukharin opposition, the Party line consists in disintegrating the Comintern, then do Rykov, Bukharin and Tomsky really wish to join

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us in disintegrating the Comintern, instead of combating this policy? How are we to believe such nonsense?

    No, comrades, there must be something wrong with Rykov's assertion that we have a single, common line. Whichever way you look at it, if we bear in mind the facts just set forth regard ing the declarations and conduct of Bukharin's group, there is something amiss with the business of one, common line.

    If there is only one line, then how are we to account for the policy of resigning adopted by Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky? Is it conceivable that where there is a common general line, one part of the Political Bureau would systematically refuse to implement the repeated decisions of the Central Committee of the Party and continue to sabotage Party work for six months? If we really have a single, common, general line, how are we to account for this disruptive policy of resigning that is being methodically pursued by one part of the Political Bureau?

    From the history of our Party we know of examples of the policy of resigning. We know, for instance, that on the day after the October Revolution some comrades, led by Kamenev and Zinoviev, refused the posts assigned to them and demanded that the policy of the Party should be changed. We know that at that time they sought to justify the policy of resigning by demanding the creation of a coalition government that would include the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, in opposition to the Central Committee of our Party whose policy was to form a purely Bolshevik government. But at that time there was some sense in the policy of resigning, because it was based on the existence of two different lines, one of which was for forming a purely Bolshevik government, and the other for forming a coalition government jointly with the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. That was clear and comprehensible. But we see no logic, no logic whatsoever, when the

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Bukharin opposition, on the one hand, proclaims the unity of the general line, and, on the other hand, pursues a policy of resigning, adopted from that of Zinoviev and Kamenev in the period of the October Revolution.

    One thing or the other -- either there is only one line, in which case Bukharin and his friends' policy of resigning is incomprehensible and inexplicable; or we have two lines, in which case the policy of resigning is perfectly comprehensible and explicable.

    If there is only one line, how are we to explain the fact that the trio of the Political Bureau -- Rykov, Bukharin and Tomsky -- deemed it possible, during the voting in the Political Bureau, to abstain when the main theses on the five-year plan and on the peasant question were being adopted? Does it ever happen that there is a single general line but that one section of the comrades abstains from voting on the main questions of our economic policy? No, comrades, such wonders do not occur.

    Finally, if there is only one line, and there are only shades of difference between us, why did the comrades of the Bukharin opposition -- Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky -- reject the compromise proposed by a commission of the Political Bureau on February 7 of this year? Is it not a fact that this compromise gave Bukharin's group a perfectly acceptable way out of the impasse in which it had landed itself?

    Here is the text of this compromise proposed by the majority of the Central Committee on February 7 of this year:

    "After an exchange of views in the commission it was ascertained that:
    "1) Bukharin admits that his negotiations with Kamenev were a political error;
    "2) Bukharin admits that the assertions contained in his 'declaration' of January 30, 1929, alleging that the Central Committee is in fact pursuing

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a policy of 'military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry,' that the Central Committee is disintegrating the Comintern and is fostering bureaucracy within the Party -- that all these assertions were made in the heat of the moment, during passionate polemics, that he does not maintain these assertions any longer, and considers that there are no differences between him and the Central Committee on these questions;
    "3) Bukharin recognizes, therefore, that harmonious work in the Political Bureau is possible and necessary;
    "4) Bukharin withdraws his resignation both as regards Pravda and as regards the Comintern;
    "5) consequently, Bukharin withdraws his declaration of January 30.
    "On the basis of the above, the commission considers it possible not to submit its draft resolution containing a political appraisal of Bukharin's errors to the joint meeting of the Political Bureau and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission, and suggests that the joint meeting of the Political Bureau and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission withdraw from circulation all existing documents (verbatim reports of speeches, etc.).
    "The commission suggests that the Political Bureau and the Presidium of the C.C.C. provide Bukharin with all the conditions necessary for his normal work as editor-in-chief of Pravda and Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Comintern."

    Why did Bukharin and his friends reject this compromise if we really have only one line, and if there are only shades of difference between us? Is it not perfectly obvious that Bukharin and his friends should have been extremely eager to seize upon the compromise proposed by the Political Bureau, so as to put an end to the tension existing within the Party and create an atmosphere conducive to unanimity and harmony in the work of the Political Bureau?

    There is talk of the unity of the Party, of collective work in the Political Bureau. But is it not obvious that anyone who wants genuine unity and values the collective principle in work should have accepted the compromise? Why then did Bukharin and his friends reject this compromise?

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    Is it not obvious that if we had only one line, then there would never have been either the trio's declaration of February 9 or Bukharin and his friends' refusal to accept the compromise proposed by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee?

    No, comrades, if we bear in mind the facts set forth above, there must be something amiss with the business of your one, common line.

    It turns out that in reality we have not one line, but two lines; one of them being the line of the Central Committee and the other the line of Bukharin's group.

    In his speech, Rykov did not tell the truth when he declared that we have only one general line. He sought thereby to disguise his own line, which differs from the Party line, for the purpose of stealthily undermining the Party line. The policy of opportunism consists precisely in attempting to slur over disagreements, to gloss over the actual situation within the Party, to disguise one's own position and to make it impossible for the Party to attain complete clarity.

    Why does opportunism need such a policy? Because it enables opportunists to carry out in effect their own line, which differs from the Party line, behind a smoke screen of talk about the unity of the line. In his speech at the present plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission Rykov adopted this opportunist standpoint.

    Would you care to hear a characterization of the opportunist in general, as given by Comrade Lenin in one of his articles? This characterization is important for us not only because of its general significance, but also because it fits Rykov perfectly.

    Here is what Lenin says about the specific features of opportunism and of opportunists:

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    What are our disagreements? What are they connected with?

    They are connected, first of all, with the class changes that have been taking place recently in our country and in capitalist countries. Some comrades think that the disagreements in our Party are of an accidental nature. That is wrong, comrades. That is quite wrong. The disagreements in our Party have their roots in the class changes, in the intensification of the class struggle which has been taking place lately and which marks a turning point in development.

    The chief mistake of Bukharin's group is that it fails to see these changes and this turning point; it does not see them, and does not want to notice them. That, in fact, explains the failure to understand the new tasks of the Party and of the Comintern, which is the characteristic feature of the Bukharin opposition.

    Have you noticed, comrades, that the leaders of the Bukharin opposition, in their speeches at the plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, completely evaded the question of the class changes in our country, that they did not say a single word about the intensification of the class struggle and did not even remotely hint at the fact that our disagreements are connected with this very intensification of the class struggle? They talked about everything, about philosophy and about theory, but they did not say a single word about the class changes which determine the orientation and the practical activity of our Party at the present moment.

    How is this strange fact to be explained? Is it forgetfulness, perhaps? Of course not! Political leaders cannot forget the chief thing. The explanation is that they neither see nor under-

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stand the new revolutionary processes now going on both here, in our country, and in the capitalist countries. The explanation is that they have overlooked the chief thing, they have overlooked those class changes, which a political leader has no right to overlook. This is the real explanation for the confusion and unpreparedness displayed by the Bukharin opposition in face of the new tasks of our Party.

    Recall the recent events in our Party. Recall the slogans our Party has issued lately in connection with the new class changes in our country. I refer to such slogans as the slogan of self-ctiticism, the slogan of intensifying the fight against bureaucracy and of purging the Soviet apparatus, the slogan of training new economic cadres and Red experts, the slogan of strengthening the collective-farm and state-farm movement, the slogan of an offensive against the kulaks, the slogan of reducing production costs and radically improving the methods of trade-union work, the slogan of purging the Party, etc. To some comrades these slogans seemed staggering and dizzying. Yet it is obvious that these slogans are the most necessary and urgent slogans of the Party at the present moment.

    I have already said that Bukharin does not see and does not understand the new tasks of the Comintern along the line of driving the Rights out of the Communist Parties, of curbing conciliation, and of purging the Communist Parties of Social Democratic traditions -- tasks which are dictated by the maturing conditions for a new revolutionary upsurge. This thesis is fully confirmed by our disagreements on Comintern questions.

    How did the disagreements in this sphere begin?

    I have spoken above on the class changes and the class struggle in our country. I said that Bukharin's group is afflicted with blindness and does not see these changes, does not understand the new tasks of the Party. I said that this has

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caused bewilderment among the Bukharin opposition, has made it fearful of difficulties and ready to yield to them.

    It cannot be said that these mistakes of the Bukharinites are purely accidental. On the contrary, they are connected with the stage of development we have already passed through and which is known as the period of restoration of the national economy, a period during which construction proceeded peace fully, automatically, so to speak; during which the class changes now taking place did not yet exist; and during which the intensification of the class struggle that we now observe was not yet in evidence.

    But we are now at a new stage of development, distinct from the old period, from the period of restoration. We are now in a new period of construction, the period of the reconstruction of the whole national economy on the basis of socialism. This new period is giving rise to new class changes, to an intensification of the class struggle. It demands new methods of struggle, the regrouping of our forces, the improvement and strengthening of all our organizations.

    The misfortune of Bukharin's group is that it is living in the past, that it fails to see the specihc features of this new period and does not understand the need for new methods of struggle. Hence its blindness, its bewilderment, its panic in the face of difficulties.

    What is the theoretical basis of this blindness and bewilderment of Bukharin's group?

    I think that the theoretical basis of this blindness and bewilderment is Bukharin's incorrect, non-Marxist approach to the question of the class struggle in our country. I have in mind Bukharin's non-Marxist theory of the kulaks growing

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into socialism, his failure to understand the mechanics of the class struggle under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

    The well-known passage from Bukharin's book, The Path to Socialism, on the kulaks growing into socialism has been quoted several times here. But it has been quoted here with some omissions. Permit me to quote it in full. This is necessary, comrades, in order to demonstrate the full extent of Bukharin's departure from the Marxist theory of the class struggle.

    Listen:

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    Rosit : Bukharin says, "an alien body."

    Stalin : Bukharin says not "an alien body," but "to a certain extent an alien body." Consequently, the kulaks and concessionaires are "to a certain extent" an alien body in the system of socialism. But Bukharin's mistake is precisely that, according to him, kulaks and concessionaires, while being "to a certain extent" an alien body, nevertheless grow into socialism.

    Such is the nonsense to which Bukharin's theory leads.

    Capitalists in town and country, kulaks and concessionaires, growing into socialism -- such is the absurdity Bukharin has arrived at.

    No, comrades, that is not the kind of "socialism" we want. Let Bukharin keep it for himself.

    Until now, we Marxist-Leninists have been of the opinion that between the capitalists of town and country, on the one hand, and the working class, on the other hand, there is an irreconcilable antagonism of interests. That is what the Marxist theory of the class struggle rests on. But now, ac cording to Bukharin's theory of the capitalists' peaceful growth into socialism, all this is turned upside down, the ir reconcilable antagonism of class interests between the exploiters and the exploited disappears, the exploiters grow into socialism.

    Rosit : That is not true, the dictatorship of the proletariat is presumed.

    Stalin : But the dictatorship of the proletariat is the sharpest form of the class struggle.

    Rosit : Yes, that is the whole point.

    Stalin : But, according to Bukharin, the capitalists grow into this very dictatorship of the proletariat. How is it that you cannot understand this, Rosit? Against whom must we fight, against whom must we wage the sharpest form of the

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class struggle, if the capitalists of town and country grow into the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat?

    The dictatorship of the proletariat is needed for the purpose of waging a relentless struggle against the capitalist elements, for the purpose of suppressing the bourgeoisie and of uprooting capitalism. But if the capitalists of town and country, if the kulak and the concessionaire are growing into socialism, is the dictatorship of the proletariat needed at all? If it is, then for the suppression of what class is it needed?

    Rosit : The whole point is that, according to Bukharin, the growing into presumes the class struggle.

    Stalin : I see that Rosit has sworn to be of service to Bukharin. But his service is really like that of the bear in the fable; for in his eagerness to save Bukharin he is actually hugging him to death. It is not without reason that it is said, "An obliging fool is more dangerous than an enemy." (General laughter.)

    One thing or the other: either there is an irreconcilable antagonism of interests between the capitalist class and the class of the workers who have come to power and have or ganized their dictatorship, or there is no such antagonism of interests, in which case only one thing remains -- namely, to proclaim the harmony of class interests.

    One thing or the other:

    either Marx's theory of the class struggle, or the theory of the capitalists growing into socialism;

    either an irreconcilable antagonism of class interests, or the theory of harmony of class interests.

    We can understand "socialists" of the type of Brentano or Sydney Webb preaching about socialism growing into capitalism and capitalism into socialism, for these "socialists" are really anti-socialists, bourgeois liberals. But one cannot un-

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derstand a man who wishes to be a Marxist, and who at the same time preachcs the theory of the capitalist class growing into socialism.

    In his speech Bukharin tried to reinforce the theory of the kulaks growing into socialism by referring to a well-known passage from Lenin. He asserted that Lenin says the same thing as Bukharin.

    That is not true, comrades. It is a gross and unpardonable slander against Lenin.

    Here is the text of this passage from Lenin:

    Bukharin's second mistake, which follows from his first one, consists in a wrong, non-Marxist approach to the question of the intensification of the class struggle, of the increasing resistance of the capitalist elements to the socialist policy of the Soviet government.

    What is the point at issue here? Is it that the capitalist elements are growing faster than the socialist sector of our economy, and that, because of this, they are increasing their resistance, undermining socialist construction? No, that is not the point. Moreover, it is not true that the capitalist elements are growing faster than the socialist sector. If that were true, socialist construction would already be on the verge of collapse.

    The point is that socialism is successfully attacking the capitalist elements, socialism is growing faster than the capitalist elements; as a result the relative importance of the capitalist elements is declining, and for the very reason that the relative importance of the capitalist elements is declining the capitalist elements realize that they are in mortal danger and are increasing their resistance.

    And they are still able to increase their resistance not only because world capitalism is supporting them, but also because, in spite of the decline in their relative importance, in spite of the decline in their relative growth as compared with the growth of socialism, there is still taking place an absolute growth of the capitalist elements, and this, to a certain extent, enables them to accumulate forces to resist the growth of socialism.

    It is on this basis that, at the present stage of development and under the present conditions of the relation of forces, the intensification of the class struggle and the increase in the re-

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sistance of the capitalist elements of town and country are taking place.

    The mistake of Bukharin and his friends lies in failing to understand this simple and obvious truth. Their mistake lies in approaching the matter not in a Marxist, but in a philistine way, and trying to explain the intensification of the class struggle by all kinds of accidental causes: the "incompetence" of the Soviet apparatus, the "imprudent" policy of local comrades, the "absence" of flexibility, "excesses," etc., etc.

    Here, for instance, is a quotation from Bukharin's pamphlet, The Path to Socialism, which demonstrates an absolutely non-Marxist approach to the question of the intensification of the class struggle:

    "Here and there the class struggle in the countryside breaks out in its former manifestations, and, as a rule, this intensification is provoked by the kulak elements. When, for instance, kulaks, or people who are growing rich at the expense of others and have wormed their way into the organs of Soviet power, begin to shoot village correspondents, that is a manifestation of the class struggle in its most acute form. (This is not true, for the most acute form of the struggle is rebellion. -- J. St.) However, such incidents, as a rule, occur in those places where the local Soviet apparatus is weak. As this apparatus improves, as all the lower units of Soviet power become stronger, as the local, village, Party and Young Communist League organizations improve and become stronger, such phenomena, it is perfectly obvious, will become more and more rare and will finally disappear without a trace."*

    It follows, therefore, that the intensification of the class struggle is to be explained by causes connected with the character of the apparatus, the competence or incompetence, the strength or weakness of our lower organizations.

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sistance of the bourgeois elements to the Soviet government and a form of intensification of the class struggle, are to be explained, not by the relation of class forces, not by the growth of socialism, but by the incompetence of our apparatus.

    It follows that before the wholesale wrecking occurred in the Shakhty area, our apparatus was a good one, but that later, the moment wholesale wrecking occurred, the apparatus, for some unspecified reason, suddenly became utterly incompetent.

    It follows that until last year, when grain procurements proceeded automatically and there was no particular intensification of the class struggle, our local organizations were good, even ideal; but that from last year, when the resistance of the kulaks assumed particularly acute forms, our organizations have suddenly become bad and utterly incompetent.

    That is not an explanation, but a mockery of an explanation. That is not science, but quackery.

    What then is the actual reason for this intensification of the class struggle?

    There are two reasons.

    Firstly, our advance, our offensive, the growth of socialist forms of economy both in industry and in agriculture, a growth which is accompanied by a corresponding ousting of certain sections of capitalists in town and country. The fact is that we are living according to Lenin's formula: "Who will beat whom?" Will we overpower them, the capitalists -- engage them, as Lenin put it, in the last and decisive fight -- or will they overpower us?

    Secondly, the fact that the capitalist elements have no desire to depart from the scene voluntarily; they are resisting, and will continue to resist socialism, for they realize that their last days are approaching. And they are still able to resist-

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because, in spite of the decline of their relative importance, they are nevertheless growing in absolute numbers; the petty bourgeoisie in town and country, as Lenin said, daily and hourly produces from its midst capitalists, big and small, and these capitalist elements go to all lengths to preserve their existence.

    There have been no cases in history where dying classes have voluntarily departed from the scene. There have been no cases in history where the dying bourgeoisie has not exerted all its remaining strength to preserve its existence. Whether our lower Soviet apparatus is good or bad, our advance, our offensive will diminish the capitalist elements and oust them, and they, the dying classes, will carry on their resistance at all costs.

    That is the basis for the intensification of the class struggle in our country.

    The mistake of Bukharin and his friends is that they identify the growing resistance of the capitalists with the growth of the latter's relative importance. But there are absolutely no grounds for this identification. There are no grounds because the fact that the capitalists are resisting by no means implies that they have become stronger than we are. The very opposite is the case. The dying classes are resisting, not because they have become stronger than we are, but because socialism is growing faster than they are, and they are becoming weaker than we are. And precisely because they are becoming weaker, they feel that their last days are approaching and are compelled to resist with all the forces and all the means in their power.

    Such is the mechanics of the intensification of the class struggle and of the resistance of the capitalists at the present moment of history.

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    What should be the policy of the Party in view of this state of affairs?

    The policy should be to arouse the working class and the exploited masses of the countryside, to increase their fighting capacity and develop their mobilized preparedness for the fight against the capitalist elements in town and country, for the fight against the resisting class enemies.

    The Marxist-Leninist theory of the class struggle is valuable, among other reasons, because it facilitates the mobilization of the working class against the enemies of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

    Wherein lies the harm of the Bukharin theory of the capitalists growing into socialism and of the Bukharin conception of the intensification of the class struggle?

    It lies in the fact that it lulls the working class to sleep, undermines the mobilized preparedness of the revolutionary forces of our country, demobilizes the working class and facilitates the attack of the capitalist elements against the Soviet regime.

    Bukharin's third mistake is on the question of the peasantry. As you know, this question is one of the most important questions of our policy. In the conditions prevailing in our country, the peasantry consists of various social groups, namely, the poor peasants, the middle peasants and the kulaks. It is obvious that our attitude to these various groups cannot be the same. The poor peasant as the support of the working class, the middle peasant as the ally, the kulak as the class enemy -- such is our attitude to these social groups. All this is clear and generally known.

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    Bukharin, however, regards the matter somewhat differently. In his description of the peasantry this differentiation is omitted, the existence of social groups disappears, and there remains but a single drab patch, called the countryside. According to him, the kulak is not a kulak, and the middle peasant is not a middle peasant, but there is a sort of uniform poverty in the countryside. That is what he said in his speech here: Can our kulak really be called a kulak? he said. Why, he is a pauper! And our middle peasant, is he really like a middle peasant? Why, he is a pauper, living on the verge of starvation. Obviously, such a view of the peasantry is a radically wrong view, incompatible with Leninism.

    Lenin said that the individual peasantry is the last capitalist class. Is that thesis correct? Yes, it is absolutely correct. Why is the individual peasantry defined as the last capitalist class? Because, of the two main classes of which our society is composed, the peasantry is the class whose economy is based on private property and small commodity production. Because the peasantry, as long as it remains an individual peasantry carrying on small commodity production, produces capitalists from its midst, and cannot help producing them, constantly and continuously.

    This fact is of decisive importance for us in the question of our Marxist attitude to the problem of the alliance between the working class and the peasantry. This means that we need, not just any kind of alliance with the peasantry, but only such an alliance as is based on the struggle against the capitalist elements of the peasantry.

    As you see, Lenin's thesis about the peasantry being the last capitalist class not only does not contradict the idea of an alliance between the working class and the peasantry, but, on the contrary, supplies the basis for this alliance as an alliance

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between the working class and the majority of the peasantry directed against the capitalist elements in general and against the capitalist elements of the peasantry in the countryside in particular.

    Lenin advanced this thesis in order to show that the alliance between the working class and the peasantry can be stable only if it is based on the struggle against those capitalist elements which the peasantry produces from its midst.

    Bukharin's mistake is that he does not understand and does not accept this simple thing, he forgets about the social groups in the countryside, he loses sight of the kulaks and the poor peasants, and all that remains is one uniform mass of middle peasants.

    This is undoubtedly a deviation to the Right on the part of Bukharin, in contradistinction to the "Left," Trotskyite, deviation, which sees no other social groups in the countryside than the poor peasants and the kulaks, and which loses sight of the middle peasants.

    Wherein lies the difference between Trotskyism and Bukharin's group on the question of the alliance with the peasantry? It lies in the fact that Trotskyism is opposed to the policy of a stable alliance with the middle-peasant masses, while Bukharin's group is in favour of any kind of alliance with the peasantry in general. There is no need to prove that both these positions are wrong and that they are equally worthless.

    Leninism unquestionably stands for a stable alliance with the main mass of the peasantry, for an alliance with the middle peasants; but not just any kind of alliance, however, but such an alliance with the middle peasants as ensures the leading role of the working class, consolidates the dictatorship of the proletariat and facilitates the abolition of classes.

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    Bukharin's fourth mistake is on the question of NEP (the New Economic Policy). Bukharin's mistake is that he fails to see the two-fold character of NEP, he sees only one aspect of NEP. When we introduced NEP in 1921, we directed its spearhead against War Communism, against a regime and system which excluded any and every form of freedom for private trade. We considered, and still consider, that NEP implies a certain freedom for private trade. Bukharin remembers this aspect of the matter. That is very good.

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more important for us than the first. In our country there is no free play of prices in the market, such as is usually the case in capitalist countries. We, in the main, determine the price of grain. We determine the prices of manufactured goods. We try to carry out a policy of reducing production costs and reducing prices of manufactured goods, while striving to stabilize the prices of agricultural produce. Is it not obvious that such special and specific market conditions do not exist in capitalist countries?

    From this it follows that as long as NEP exists, both its aspects must be retained: the first aspect, which is directed against the regime of War Communism and aims at ensuring a certain freedom for private trade, and the second aspect, which is directed against complete freedom for private trade, and aims at ensuring the role of the state as the regulator of the market. Destroy one of these aspects, and the New Economic Policy disappears.

    Bukharin thinks that danger can threaten NEP only "from the Left," from people who want to abolish all freedom of trade. That is not true. It is a gross error. Moreover, such a danger is the least real at the present moment, since there is nobody, or hardly anybody, in our local and central organizations now who does not understand the necessity and expediency of preserving a certain measure of freedom of trade.

    The danger from the Right, from those who want to abolish the role of the state as the regulator of the market, who want to "emancipate" the market and thereby open up an era of complete freedom for private trade, is much more real. There cannot be the slightest doubt that the danger of disrupting NEP from the Right is much more real at the present time.

    It should not be forgotten that the petty-bourgeois elemental forces are working precisely in this direction, in the direction

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of disrupting NEP from the Right. It should also be borne in mind that the outcries of the kulaks and the well-to-do elements, the outcries of the speculators and profiteers, to which many of our comrades often yield, bombard NEP from precisely this quarter. The fact that Bukharin does not see this second, and very real, danger of NEP being disrupted undoubtedly shows that he has yielded to the pressure of the petty-bourgeois elemental forces.

    Bukharin proposes to "normalize" the market and to "manoeuvre" with grain-procurement prices according to areas, i.e., to raise the price of grain. What does this mean? It means that he is not satisfied with Soviet market conditions, he wants to put a brake on the role of the state as the regulator of the market and proposes that concessions be made to the petty-bourgeois elemental forces, which are disrupting NEP from the Right.

    Let us assume for a moment that we followed Bukharin's advice. What would be the result? We raise the price of grain in the autumn, let us say, at the beginning of the grain-purchasing period. But since there are always people on the market, all sorts of speculators and profiteers, who can pay three times as much for grain, and since we cannot keep up with the speculators, for they buy some 10 million poods in all while we have to buy hundreds of millions of poods, those who hold grain will all the same continue to hold it in expectation of a further rise in price. Consequently, towards the spring, when the state's real need for grain mainly begins, we should again have to raise the price of grain. But what would raising the price of grain in the spring mean? It would mean ruining the poor and economically weaker strata of the rural population, who are themselves obliged to buy grain in the spring, partly for seed and partly for food -- the very grain which

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they sold in the autumn at a lower price. Can we by such operations obtain any really useful results in the way of securing a sufficient quantity of grain? Most probably not, for there will always be speculators and profiteers able to pay twice and three times as much for the same grain. Consequently, we would have to be prepared to raise the price of grain once again in a vain effort to catch up with the speculators and profiteers.

    From this, however, it follows that once having started on the path of raising grain prices we should have to continue down the slippery slope without any guarantee of securing a sufficient quantity of grain.

    But the matter does not end there.

    Firstly, having raised grain-procurement prices, we should then also have to raise the prices of raw materials supplied by agriculture, in order to maintain a certain proportion in the prices of agricultural produce.

    Secondly, having raised grain-procurement prices, we should not be able to maintain low retail prices of bread in the towns -- consequently, we should have to raise the selling price of bread. And since we cannot and must not injure the workers, we should have to increase wages at an accelerated pace. But this is bound to lead to a rise in the prices of manufactured goods, for, otherwise, there could be a diversion of resources from the towns into the countryside to the detriment of industrialization.

    As a result, we should have to adjust the prices of manufactured goods and of agricultural produce not on the basis of falling or, at any rate, stabilized prices, but on the basis of rising prices, both of grain and of manufactured goods.

    In other words, we should have to pursue a policy of raising the prices of manufactured goods and agricultural produce.

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    It is not difficult to understand that such "manoeuvring" with prices can only lead to the complete nullification of the Soviet price policy, to the nullification of the role of the state as the regulator of the market, and to giving a free rein to the petty-bourgeois elemental forces.

    Who would profit by this?

    Only the well-to-do strata of the urban and rural population, for expensive manufactured goods and agricultural produce would necessarily become out of the reach both of the working class and of the poor and economically weaker strata of the rural population. It would profit the kulaks and the well-to-do, the Nepmen and other prosperous classes.

    That, too, would be a bond, but a peculiar one, a bond with the wealthy strata of the rural and urban population. The workers and the economically weaker strata of the rural population would have every right to ask us: Whose government are you, a workers' and peasants' government or a kulak and Nepmen's government?

    A rupture with the working class and the economically weaker strata of the rural population, and a bond with the wealthy strata of the urban and rural population -- that is what Bukharin's "normalization" of the market and "manoeuvring" with grain prices according to areas must lead to.

    Obviously, the Party cannot take this fatal path.

    The extent to which all conceptions of NEP in Bukharin's mind have become muddled and the extent to which he is firmly held captive by the petty-bourgeois elemental forces is shown, among other things, by the more than negative attitude he displays to the question of the new forms of trade turnover between town and country, between the state and the peasantry. He is indignant and cries out against the fact that the state has become the supplier of goods for the peasantry and that

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the peasantry is becoming the supplier of grain for the state. He regards this as a violation of all the rules of NEP, as almost the disruption of NEP. Why? On what grounds?

    What can there be objectionable in the fact that the state, state industry, is the supplier, without middlemen, of goods for the peasantry, and that the peasantry is the supplier of grain for industry, for the state, also without middlemen?

    What can there be objectionable, from the point of view of Marxism and a Marxist policy, in the fact that the peasantry has already become the supplier of cotton, beet and flax for the needs of state industry, and that state industry has become the supplier of urban goods, seed and instruments of production for these branches of agriculture?

    The contract system is here the principal method of establishing these new forms of trade turnover between town and country. But is the contract system contrary to the principles of NEP?

    What can there be objectionable in the fact that, thanks to this contract system, the peasantry is becoming the state's supplier not only of cotton, beet and flax, but also of grain?

    If trade in small consignments, petty trade, can be termed trade turnover, why cannot trade in large consignments, conducted by means of agreements concluded in advance (contracts) as to price and quality of goods be regarded as trade turnover?

    Is it difficult to understand that it is on the basis of NEP that these new, mass forms of trade turnover between town and country based on the contract system have arisen, that they mark a very big step forward on the part of our organizations as regards strengthening the planned, socialist direction of our national economy?

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    Bukharin has lost the capacity to understand these simple and obvious things.

    Bukharin's fifth mistake (I am speaking of his principal mistakes) is his opportunist distortion of the Party line on the question of the "scissors" between town and country, on the question of the so-called "tribute."

    What is the point dealt with in the well-known resolution of the joint meeting of the Political Bureau and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission (February 1929) on the question of the "scissors"? What is said there is that, in addition to the usual taxes, direct and indirect, which the peasantry pays to the state, the peasantry also pays a certain supertax in the form of an over-payment for manufactured goods, and in the form of an under-payment received for agricultural produce.

    Is it true that this supertax paid by the peasantry actually exists? Yes, it is. What other name have we for this supertax? We also call it the "scissors," the "diversion" of resources from agriculture into industry for the purpose of speeding up our industrial development.

    Is this "diversion" necessary? We all agree that, as a temporary measure, it is necessary if we really wish to maintain a speedy rate of industrial development. Indeed, we must at all costs maintain a rapid growth of our industry, for this growth is necessary not only for industry itself, but primarily for agriculture, for the peasantry, which at the present time needs most of all tractors, agricultural machinery and fertilizers.

    Can we abolish this supertax at the present time? Unfortunately, we cannot. We must abolish it at the first oppor-

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tunity, in the next few years. But we cannot abolish it at the present moment.

    Now, as you see, this supertax obtained as a result of the "scissors" does constitute "something in the nature of a tribute." Not a tribute, but "something in the nature of a tribute." It is "something in the nature of a tribute" on account of our backwardness. We need this supertax to stimulate the development of our industry and to do away with our backwardness.

    Finally, the question of the rate of development of industry and of the new forms of the bond between town and country. This is one of the most important questions of our disagree-

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ments. Its importance lies in the fact that it is the converging point of all the threads of our practical disagreements about the economic policy of the Party.

    What are the new forms of the bond, what do they signify from the point of view of our economic policy?

    They signify, first of all, that besides the old forms of the bond between town and country, whereby industry chiefly satisfied the personal requirements of the peasant (cotton fabrics, footwear, and textiles in general, etc.), we now need new forms of the bond, whereby industry will satisfy the productive requirements of peasant economy (agricultural machinery, tractors, improved seed, fertilizers, etc.).

    Whereas formerly we satisfied mainly the personal requirements of the peasant, hardly touching the productive requirements of his economy, now, while continuing to satisfy the personal requirements of the peasant, we must do our utmost to supply agricultural machinery, tractors, fertilizers, etc., which have a direct bearing on the reconstruction of agricultural production on a new technical basis.

    As long as it was a question of restoring agriculture and of the peasants putting into use the land formerly belonging to the landlords and kulaks, we could be content with the old forms of the bond. But now, when it is a question of reconstructing agriculture, that is not enough. Now we must go further and help the peasantry to reorganize agricultural production on the basis of new technique and collective labour.

    Secondly, they signify that simultaneously with the re-equipment of our industry, we must begin seriously re-equipping agriculture too. We are re-equipping, and have already partly re-equipped our industry, placing it on a new technical basis, supplying it with new, improved machinery and new, improved cadres. We are building new mills and fac-

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tories and are reconstructing and extending the old ones; we are developing the metallurgical, chemical and machine-building industries. On this basis cities are growing, new industrial centres are multiplying and the old ones are expanding. On this basis the demand for food products and for raw materials for industry is growing. But agriculture continues to employ the old equipment, the old methods of tillage practised by our fore-fathers, the old, primitive, now useless, or nearly useless technique, the old, small-peasant, individual forms of farming and labour.

    Consider, for example, the fact that before the Revolution we had nearly 16 million peasant households, while now there are no less than 25 million. What does this indicate if not that agriculture is becoming more and more scattered and disunited. And the characteristic feature of scattered small farms is that they are unable properly to employ technique, machines, tractors and scientific agronomic knowledge, that they are farms with a small marketable surplus.

    Hence the insufficient output of agricultural produce for the market.

    Hence the danger of a rift between town and country, between industry and agriculture.

    Hence the necessity for increasing the rate of development of agriculture, bringing it up to that of our industry.

    And so, in order to eliminate this danger of a rift, we must begin seriously re-equipping agriculture on the basis of new technique But in order to re-equip it we must gradually unite the scattered individual peasant farms into large farms, into collective farms; we must build up agriculture on the basis of collective labour, we must enlarge the collectives, we must develop the old and new state farms, we must systematically employ the contract system on a mass scale in all the principal

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branches of agriculture, we must develop the system of machine and tractor stations which help the peasantry to master the new technique and to collectivize labour -- in a word, we must gradually transfer the small individual peasant farms to the basis of large-scale collective production, for only large-scale production of a socially-conducted type is capable of making full use of scientific knowledge and modern technique, and of advancing the development of our agriculture with giant strides.

    This, of course, does not mean that we must neglect poor and middle individual peasant farming. Not at all. Poor and middle individual peasant farming plays a predominant part in supplying industry with food and raw materials, and will continue to do so in the immediate future. For that very reason we must continue to assist poor and middle individual peasant farms which have not yet united into collective farms.

    But this does mean that individual peasant farming alone is no longer adequate. That is shown by our grain-procurement difficulties. That is why the development of poor and middle individual peasant farming must be supplemented by the widest possible development of collective forms of farming and of state farms.

    That is why we must make a bridge between poor and middle individual peasant farming and collective, socially-conducted forms of farming by means of the contract system on a mass scale, by means of machine and tractor stations and by the fullest development of a co-operative communal life in order to help the peasants to transfer their small, individual farming on to the lines of collective labour.

    Failing this it will be impossible to develop agriculture to any extent. Failing this it will be impossible to solve the grain

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problem. Failing this it will be impossible to save the economically weaker strata of the peasantry from poverty and ruin.

    Finally, this signifies that we must develop our industry to the utmost as the principal source from which agriculture will be supplied with the means required for its reconstruction: we must develop our metallurgical, chemical and machine-building industries; we must build tractor works, agricultural-machinery works, etc.

    There is no need to prove that it is impossible to develop collective farms, that it is impossible to develop machine and tractor stations, without drawing the main mass of the peasantry into collective forms of farming, with the aid of the contract system on a mass scale, without supplying agriculture with a fairly large quantity of tractors, agricultural machinery, etc.

    But it will be impossible to supply the countryside with machines and tractors unless we accelerate the development of our industry. Hence, rapid development of our industry is the key to the reconstruction of agriculture on the basis of collectivism.

    Such is the significance and importance of the new forms of the bond.

    Bukharin's group is obliged to admit, in words, the necessity of the new forms of the bond. But it is an admission only in words, with the intention, under cover of a verbal recognition of the new forms of the bond, of smuggling in something which is the very opposite. Actually, Bukharin is opposed to the new forms of the bond. Bukharin's starting point is not a rapid rate of development of industry as the lever for the reconstruction of agriculture, but the development of individual peasant farming. He puts in the foreground the "normalization" of the market and permission for the free play of prices on the agricultural produce market, complete freedom for private

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trade. Hence his distrustful attitude to the collective farms which manifested itself in his speech at the July plenum of the Central Committee and in his theses prior to that July plenum. Hence his disapproval of any form of emergency measures against the kulaks during grain procurement.

    We know that Bukharin shuns emergency measures as the devil shuns holy water.

    We know that Bukharin is still unable to understand that under present conditions the kulak will not supply a sufficient quantity of grain voluntarily, of his own accord.

    That has been proved by our two years' experience of grain-procurement work.

    But what if, in spite of everything, there is not enough marketable grain? To this Bukharin replies: Do not worry the kulaks with emergency measures; import grain from abroad. Not long ago he proposed that we import about 50 million poods of grain, i.e., to the value of about 100 million rubles in foreign currency. But what if foreign currency is required to import equipment for industry? To this Bukharin replies: Preference must be given to grain imports -- thus, evidently, relegating imports of equipment for industry to the background.

    It follows, therefore, that the basis for the solution of the grain problem and for the reconstruction of agriculture is not a rapid rate of development of industry, but the development of individual peasant farming, including kulak farming, on the basis of a free market and the free play of prices in the market.

    Thus we have two different plans of economic policy.

    The Party's plan :

    1. We are re-equipping industry (reconstruction).

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    2. We are beginning seriously to re-equip agriculture (reconstruction).

    3. For this we must expand the development of collective farms and state farms, employ on a mass scale the contract system and machine and tractor stations as means of establishing a bond between industry and agriculture in the sphere of production.

    4. As for the present grain-procurement difficulties, we must admit the permissibility of temporary emergency measures that are backed by the popular support of the middle- and poor-peasant masses, as one of the means of breaking the resistance of the kulaks and of obtaining from them the maximum grain surpluses necessary for dispensing with imported grain and saving foreign currency for the development of industry.

    5. Individual poor- and middle-peasant farming plays, and will continue to play, a predominant part in supplying the country with food and raw materials; but alone it is no longer adequate -- the development of individual poor- and middle-peasant farming must therefore be supplemented by the development of collective farms and state farms, by the contract system on a mass scale, by accelerating the development of machine and tractor stations, in order to facilitate the ousting of the capitalist elements from agriculture and the gradual transfer of the individual peasant farms on to the lines of large-scale collective farming, on to the lines of collective labour.

    6. But in order to achieve all this, it is necessary first of all to accelerate the development of industry, of the metallurgical chemical and machine-building industries, tractor works, agricultural-machinery works, etc. Failing this it will be impossible to solve the grain problem just as it will be impossible to reconstruct agriculture.

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    Conclusion: The key to the reconstruction of agriculture is a rapid rate of development of our industry.

    Bukharin's plan :

    1. "Normalize" the market; permit the free play of prices on the market and a rise in the price of grain, undeterred by the fact that this may lead to a rise in the prices of manufactured goods, raw materials and bread.

    2. The utmost development of individual peasant farming accompanied by a certain reduction of the rate of development of collective farms and state farms (Bukharin's theses in July and his speech at the July plenum).

    3. Grain procurements to proceed automatically, excluding at any time or under any circumstances even a partial use of emergency measures against the kulaks, even though such measures are supported by the middle- and poor-peasant masses.

    4. In the event of shortage of grain, to import about 100 million rubles' worth of grain.

    5. And if there is not enough foreign currency to pay for grain imports and imports of equipment for industry, to reduce imports of equipment and, consequently, the rate of development of our industry -- otherwise our agriculture will simply "mark time," or even "directly decline."

    Conclusion: The key to the reconstruction of agriculture is the development of individual peasant farming.

    That is how it works out, comrades!

    Bukharin's plan is a plan to reduce the rate of development of industry and to undermine the new forms of the bond.

    Such are our disagreements.

    Sometimes the question is asked: Have we not been late in developing the new forms of the bond, in developing collective farms, state farms, etc.?

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    Some people assert that the Party was at least about two years late in starting with this work. That is wrong, comrades. It is absolutely wrong. Only noisy "Lefts," who have no con ception of the economy of the U.S.S.R., can talk like that.

    What is meant by being late in this matter? If it is a question of foreseeing the need for collective farms and state farms, then we can say that we began that at the time of the October Revolution. There cannot be the slightest doubt that already then -- at the time of the October Revolution -- the Party foresaw the need for collective farms and state farms. Lastly, one can take our programme, adopted at the Eighth Congress of the Party (March 1919). The need for collective farms and state farms is recognized there quite clearly.

    But the mere fact that the top leadership of our Party fore saw the need for collective farms and state farms was not enough for carrying into effect and organizing a mass movement for collective farms and state farms. Consequently, it is not a matter of foreseeing, but of carrying out a plan of collective-farm and state-farm development. But in order to carry out such a plan a number of conditions are required which did not exist before, and which came into existence only recently.

    That is the point, comrades.

    In order to carry out the plan for a mass movement in favour of collective farms and state farms, it is necessary, first of all, that the Party's top leadership should be supported in this matter by the mass of the Party membership. As you know, ours is a Party of a million members. It was therefore necessary to convince the mass of the Party membership of the correctness of the policy of the top leadership. That is the first point.

    Further, it is necessary that a mass movement in favour of collective farms should arise within the peasantry, that the peasants -- far from fearing the collective farms -- should

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themselves join the collective farms, having become convinced by experience of the advantage of collective farming over individual farming. This is a serious matter, requiring a certain amount of time. That is the second point.

    Further, it is necessary that the state should possess the material resources required to finance collective-farm development, to finance the collective farms and state farms. And this, dear comrades, is a matter that requires many hundreds of millions of rubles. That is the third point.

    Finally, it is necessary that industry should be fairly adequately developed so as to be able to supply agriculture with machinery, tractors, fertilizers, etc. That is the fourth point.

    Can it be asserted that all these conditions existed here two or three years ago? No, it cannot.

    It must not be forgotten that we are a party in power, not in opposition. An opposition party can issue slogans -- I am speaking of fundamental practical slogans of the movement -- in order to carry them into effect after coming into power. Nobody can accuse an opposition party of not carrying out its fundamental slogans immediately, for everybody knows that it is not the opposition party which is at the helm, but other parties.

    In the case of a party in power, however, such as our Bolshevik Party is, the matter is entirely different. The slogans of such a party are not mere agitational slogans, but something much more than that, for they have the force of practical decision, the force of law, and must be carried out immediately. Our Party cannot issue a practical slogan and then defer its implementation. That would be deceiving the masses. For a practical slogan to be issued, especially so serious a slogan as transferring the vast masses of the peasantry on to the lines of collectivism, the conditions must exist that will enable the

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slogan to be carried out directly; finally, these conditions must be created, organized. That is why it is not enough for the Party's top leadership merely to foresee the need for collective farms and state farms. That is why we also need the conditions to enable us to realize, to carry out, our slogans immediately.

    Was the mass of our Party membership ready for the utmost development of collective farms and state farms, say, some two or three years ago? No, it was not ready. The serious turn of the mass of the Party membership towards the new forms of the bond began only with the first serious grain-procurement difficulties. It required those difficulties for the mass of the Party membership to become conscious of the full necessity of accelerating the adoption of the new forms of the bond, and primarily, of the collective farms and state farms, and resolutely to support its Central Committee in this matter. This is one condition which did not exist before, but which does exist now.

    Was there any serious movement among the vast masses of the peasantry in favour of collective farms or state farms some two or three years ago? No, there was not. Everybody knows that two or three years ago the peasantry was hostilely disposed to the state farms, while they contemptuously called the collective farms the "kommunia," regarding them as something utterly useless. And now? Now, the situation is different. Now we have whole strata of the peasantry who regard the state farms and collective farms as a source of assistance to peasant farming in the way of seed, pedigree cattle, machines and tractors. Now we have only to supply machines and tractors, and collective farms will develop at an accelerated pace.

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    What was the cause of this change of attitude among certain, fairly considerable, strata of the peasantry? What helped to bring it about?

    In the first place, the development of the co-operatives and a co-operative communal life. There can be no doubt that without the powerful development of the co-operatives, particularly the agricultural co-operatives, which produced among the peasantry a psychological background in favour of the collective farms, we would not have that urge towards the collective farms which is now displayed by whole strata of the peasantry.

    An important part in this was also played by the existence of well-organized collective farms, which set the peasants good examples of how agriculture can be improved by uniting small peasant farms into large, collective, farms.

    The existence of well-organized state farms, which helped the peasants to improve their methods of farming, also played its part here. I need not mention other facts with which you are all familiar. There you have another condition which did not exist before, but which does exist now.

    Further, can it be asserted that we were able some two or three years ago to give substantial financial aid to the collective farms and state farms, to assign hundreds of millions of rubles for this purpose? No, it cannot be asserted. You know very well that we even lacked sufficient means for developing that minimum of industry without which no industrialization at all is possible, let alone the reconstruction of agriculture. Could we take those means from industry, which is the basis for the industrialization of the country, and transfer them to the collective farms and state farms? Obviously, we could not. But now? Now we have the means for developing the collective farms and state farms.

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    Finally, can it be asserted that some two or three years ago our industry was an adequate basis for supplying agriculture with large quantities of machines, tractors, etc.? No, it cannot be asserted. At that time our task was to create the minimum industrial basis required for supplying machines and tractors to agriculture in the future. It was on the creation of such a basis that our scanty financial resources were then spent. And now? Now we have this industrial basis for agriculture. At all events, this industrial basis is being created at a very rapid rate.

    It follows that the conditions required for the mass development of the collective farms and state farms were created only recently.

    That is how matters stand, comrades.

    That is why it cannot be said that we were late in developing the new forms of the bond.

    Such, in the main, are the principal mistakes committed by the theoretician of the Right opposition, Bukharin, on the fundamental questions of our policy.

    It is said that Bukharin is one of the theoreticians of our Party. This is true, of course. But the point is that not all is well with his theorizing. This is evident if only from the fact that on questions of Party theory and policy he has piled up the heap of mistakes which I have just described. These mistakes, mistakes on Comintern questions, mistakes on questions of the class struggle, the intensification of the class struggle, the peasantry, NEP, the new forms of the bond -- these mistakes could not possibly have occurred accidentally. No, these mistakes are not accidental. These mistakes of Bukharin's followed from his wrong theoretical line, from the defects in his

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theories. Yes, Bukharin is a theoretician, but he is not altogether a Marxist theoretician; he is a theoretician who has much to learn before he can become a Marxist theoretician.

    Reference has been made to the well-known letter in which Comrade Lenin speaks of Bukharin as a theoretician. Let us read this letter:

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    Allow me in this connection to refer to the well-known theoretical controversy which flared up in 1916 between Lenin and Bukharin on the question of the state. This is important for us in order to expose both Bukharin's inordinate pretensions to teach Lenin and the roots of his theoretical weaknesses on such important questions as the dictatorship of the proletariat, the class struggle, etc.

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But Bukharin thought differently. He decided that henceforth, not Lenin, but he, i.e., Bukharin, must be regarded as the creator, or, at least, the inspirer of the Marxist theory of the state.

    Hitherto we have regarded ourselves as Leninists, and we continue to do so. But it now appears that both Lenin and we, his disciples, are Bukharinites. Rather funny, comrades. But that's what happens when one has to deal with Bukharin's puffed-up pretentiousness.

    It might be thought that Bukharin's footnote to the above-mentioned article was a slip of the pen, that he wrote something silly, and then forgot about it. But it turns out that that is not the case. Bukharin, it turns out, spoke in all seriousness. That is evident, for example, from the fact that the statement he made in this footnote regarding Lenin's mistakes and Bukharin's correctness was republished recently, namely, in 1927, i.e., two years after Bukharin's first attack on Lenin, in a biographical sketch of Bukharin written by Maretsky, and it never occurred to Bukharin to protest against this . . . boldness of Maretsky. Obviously Bukharin's attack on Lenin cannot be regarded as accidental.

    It appears, therefore, that Bukharin is right, and not Lenin, that the inspirer of the Marxist theory of the state is not Lenin, but Bukharin.

    Such, comrades, is the picture of the theoretical distortions and the theoretical pretensions of Bukharin.

    And this man, after all this, has the presumption to say in his speech here that there is "something rotten" in the theoretical line of our Party, that there is a deviation towards Trotskyism in the theoretical line of our Party!

    And this is said by that same Bukharin who is making (and has made in the past) a number of gross theoretical and prac-

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tical mistakes, who only recently was a pupil of Trotsky's, and who only the other day was seeking to form a bloc with the Trotskyites against the Leninists and was paying them visits by the backdoor.

    Is that not funny, comrades?

    Permit me now to pass to Rykov's speech. While Bukharin tried to provide a theoretical basis for the Right deviation, Rykov attempted in his speech to provide it with a basis of practical proposals and to frighten us with "horrors" drawn from our difficulties in the sphere of agriculture. That does not mean that Rykov did not touch upon theoretical questions. He did touch upon them. But in doing so he made at least two serious mistakes.

    In his draft resolution on the five-year plan, which was rejected by the commission of the Political Bureau, Rykov says that "the central idea of the five-year plan is to increase the productivity of labour of the people." In spite of the fact that the commission of the Political Bureau rejected this absolutely false line, Rykov defended it here in his speech.

    Is it true that the central idea of the five-year plan in the Soviet country is to increase the productivity of labour? No, it is not true. It is not just any kind of increase in the productivity of labour of the people that we need. What we need is a specific increase in the productivity of labour of the people, namely, an increase that will guarantee the systematic supremacy of the socialist sector of the national economy over the capitalist sector. A five-year plan which overlooks this central idea is not a five-year plan, but five-year rubbish.

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    Every society, capitalist and pre-capitalist society included, is interested in increasing the productivity of labour in general. The difference between Soviet society and every other society lies in the very fact that it is interested not in just any kind of increase of the productivity of labour, but in such an increase as will ensure the supremacy of socialist forms of economy over other forms, and primarily over capitalist forms of economy, and will thus ensure that the capitalist forms of economy are overcome and ousted. But Rykov forgot this really central idea of the five-year plan of development of Soviet society. That is his first theoretical mistake.

    His second mistake is that he does not distinguish, or does not want to understand the distinction -- from the point of view of trade turnover -- between, let us say, a collective farm and all kinds of individual enterprises, including individual capitalist enterprises. Rykov assures us that from the point or view of trade turnover on the grain market, from the point of view of obtaining grain, he does not see any difference between a collective farm and a private holder of grain; to him, therefore, it is a matter of indifference whether we buy grain from a collective farm, a private holder, or an Argentinian grain merchant. That is absolutely wrong. It is a repetition of the statement of Frumkin, who at one time used to assure us that it was a matter of indifference to him where and from whom we bought grain, whether from a private dealer or from a collective farm.

    That is a masked form of defence, of rehabilitation, of justification of the kulak's machinations on the grain market. That this defence is conducted from the point of view of trade turn over does not alter the fact that it is, nevertheless, a justification of the kulak's machinations on the grain market. If from the viewpoint of trade turnover there is no difference between

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collective and non-collective forms of economy, is it worth while developing collective farms, granting them privileges and devoting ourselves to the difficult task of overcoming the capitalist elements in agriculture? It is obvious that Rykov has taken a wrong line. That is his second theoretical mistake.

    But this is by the way. Let us pass to the practical questions raised in Rykov's speech.

    Rykov said here that in addition to the five-year plan we need another, a parallel plan, namely, a two-year plan for the development of agriculture. He justified this proposal for a parallel two-year plan on the grounds of the difficulties experienced in agriculture. He said that the five-year plan was a good thing and that he was in favour of it; but that if at the same time we drew up a two-year plan for agriculture it would be still better -- otherwise agriculture would get into a fix.

    On the face of it there appears to be nothing wrong with this proposal. But upon closer scrutiny we find that the two-year plan for agriculture was invented in order to emphasi~e that the five-year plan is unreal, a plan merely on paper. Could we agree to that? No, we could not. We said to Rykov: If you are dissatisfied with the hve-year plan with regard to agriculture, if you think that the funds we are assigning in the five-year plan for developing agriculture are inadequate, then tell us plainly what your supplementary proposals are, what additional investments you propose -- we are ready to include these additional investments in agriculture in the five-year plan. And what happened? We found that Rykov had no supplementary proposals to make about additional investments in agriculture. The question arises: Why then a parallel two-year plan for agriculture?

    We said to him further: In addition to the five-year plan there are yearly plans which are part of the five-year plan.

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Let us include in the first two of the yearly plans the concrete additional proposals for developing agriculture that you have, that is, if you have any at all. And what happened? We found that Rykov had no such concrete plans for additional assignments to propose.

    We then realized that Rykov's proposal for a two-year plan was not made for the purpose of developing agriculture, but arose from a desire to emphasize that the five-year plan was unreal, a plan merely on paper, from a desire to discredit the five-year plan. For "conscience" sake, for appearance sake, a five-year plan; but for work, for practical purposes, a two-year plan -- that was Rykov's strategy. Rykov brought the two-year plan on the scene in order subsequently, during the practical work of carrying out the five-year plan, to counterpose it to the five-year plan, reconstruct the five-year plan and adapt it to the two-year plan by paring down and curtailing the assignments for industry.

    It was on these grounds that we rejected Rykov's proposal for a parallel two-year plan.

    Rykov tried here to frighten the Party by asserting that the crop area throughout the U.S.S.R. is showing a steady tendency to diminish. Moreover, he threw out the hint that the policy of the Party was to blame for the diminution of the crop area. He did not say outright that we are faced with a retrogression of agriculture, but the impression left by his speech is that something like retrogression is taking place.

    Is it true that the crop area is showing a steady tendency to diminish? No, it is not true. Rykov made use of average figures of the crop area throughout the country. But the method of

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average figures, if it is not corrected by data for individual districts, cannot be regarded as a scientific method.

    Rykov has, perhaps, read Lenin's Development of Capitalism in Russia. If he has read it he ought to remember how Lenin inveighed against the bourgeois economists for using the method of average figures showing the expansion of the crop area and ignoring the data for individual districts. It is strange that Rykov should now repeat the mistakes of the bourgeois economists. Now, if we examine the changes in the crop area according to districts, i.e., if we approach the matter scientifically, it will be seen that in certain districts the crop area is expanding steadily, while in others it sometimes diminishes, depending chiefly on meteorological conditions; moreover, there are no facts to indicate that there is a steady diminution of the crop area anywhere, even in a single important grain growing district.

    Indeed, there has recently been a decrease in the crop area in districts which have been affected by frost or drought, in certain regions of the Ukraine, for instance. . . .

    A voice : Not the whole Ukraine.

    Schlichter: In the Ukraine the crop area has increased by 2.7 per cent.

    Stalin : I am referring to the steppe regions of the Ukraine. In other districts, for instance in Siberia, the Volga region, Kazakhstan, and Bashkiria, which were not affected by un favourable weather conditions, the crop area has been steadily expanding.

    How is it that in certain districts the crop area is steadily expanding, while in others it sometimes diminishes? It cannot really be asserted that the Party has one policy in the Ukraine and another in the east or in the central area of the U.S.S.R.

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That would be absurd, comrades. Obviously weather conditions are of no little importance here.

    It is true that the kulaks are reducing their crop areas irrespective of weather conditions. For that, if you like, the policy of the Party, which is to support the poor- and middle-peasant masses against the kulaks, is "to blame." But what if it is? Did we ever pledge ourselves to pursue a policy which would satisfy all social groups in the countryside, including the kulaks? And, moreover, how can we pursue a policy which would satisfy both the exploiters and the exploited -- if we desire at all to pursue a Marxist policy? What is there strange in the fact that, as a result of our Leninist policy, which is intended to restrict and overcome the capitalist elements in the countryside, the kulaks begin partly to reduce the area of their crops? What else would you expect?

    Perhaps this policy is wrong? Then let them tell us so plainly. Is it not strange that people who ca]l themselves Marxists are so frightened as to try to make out that the partial reduction of crop areas by the kulaks is a decrease of the crop area as a whole, forgetting that besides the kulaks there are also the poor and middle peasants, whose crop area is expanding, that there are the collective farms and state farms, whose crop area is growing at an increasing rate?

    Finally, one more error in Rykov's speech regarding the crop area. Rykov complained here that in certain places, namely, where there has been the greatest development of collective farms, the tillage of the individual poor and middle peasants is beginning to diminish. That is true. But what is wrong with that? How could it be otherwise? If the poor- and middle-peasant farms are beginning to abandon individual tillage and are going over to collective farming, is it not obvious that the growth in size and numbers of the collective farms is bound to

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result in a decrease of the tillage of the individual poor and middle peasants? But what would you expect?

    The collective farms now have something over 2 million hectares of land. At the end of the five-year plan period, the collective farms will have more than 25 million hectares. At whose expense does the tillage of the collective farms expand? At the expense of the tillage of the individual poor and middle peasants. But what would you expect? How else is the individual farming of the poor and middle peasants to be transferred on to the lines of collective farming? Is it not obvious that in a large number of areas the tillage of the collective farms will expand at the expense of individual tillage?

    It is strange that people refuse to understand these elementary things.

    A lot of fairy-tales have been told here about our grain difficulties. But the main features of our current grain difficulties have been overlooked.

    First of all, it has been forgotten that this year's harvest of rye and wheat -- I refer to the gross harvest -- is about 500-600 million poods less than last year's. Could this fail to affect our grain procurements? Of course it was bound to affect them.

    Perhaps the policy of the Central Committee is responsible for this? No, the policy of the Central Committee has nothing to do with it. The explanation lies in the serious crop failure in the steppe regions of the Ukraine (frost and drought), and the partial crop failure in the North Caucasus, the Central Black Earth region, and the North-Western region.

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    That is the principal reason why our grain procurements (rye and wheat) in the Ukraine by April 1 last year totalled 200 million poods, while this year the total barely reached 26-27 million poods.

    That also explains the drop in wheat and rye procurements in the Central Black Earth region to about one-eighth and in the North Caucasus to about one-fourth.

    In certain regions in the East, grain procurements this year almost doubled. But this could not compensate, and, of course, did not compensate, for our grain deficit in the Ukraine, the North Caucasus and the Central Black Earth region.

    It must not be forgotten that in normal harvest years the Ukraine and the North Caucasus provide about one half of the total grain procurements in the U.S.S.R.

    It is strange that Rykov lost sight of this fact.

    Finally, the second circumstance, which constitutes thc chief feature of our current grain-procurement difficulties. I refer to the resistance of the kulak elements in the countryside to the grain-procurement policy of the Soviet government. Rykov ignored this circumstance. But to ignore it means to ignore the chief factor in grain procurements. What does the experience of the past two years as regard grain procurements show? It shows that the well-to-do strata of the countryside, who hold considerable grain surpluses and play an important role in the grain market, refuse to deliver voluntarily the necessary quantity of grain at the prices fixed by the Soviet government. In order to provide bread for the towns and industrial centres, for the Red Army and the regions growing industrial crops, we require about 500 million poods of grain annually. We are able to procure 300-350 million poods coming in automatically. The remaining 150 million poods have to be secured through organized pressure on the kulaks and

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the well-to-do strata of the rural population. That is what our experience of grain procurements during the past two years shows.

    What has happened during these two years? Why these changes? Why were automatic deliveries adequate before, and why are they inadequate now? What has happened is that during these years the kulak and well-to-do elements have grown, the series of good harvests has not been without benefit to them, they have become stronger economically; they have accumulated a little capital and now are in a position to manoeuvre in the market; they hold back their grain surpluses in expectation of high prices, and get a living from other crops.

    Grain should not be regarded as an ordinary commodity. Grain is not like cotton, which cannot be eaten and which cannot be sold to everybody. Unlike cotton, grain, under our present conditions, is a commodity which everybody will take and without which it is impossible to exist. The kulak takes this into account and holds back his grain, infecting the grain holders in general by his example. The kulak knows that grain is the currency of currencies. The kulak knows that a surplus of grain is not only a means of self-enrichment, but also a means of enslaving the poor peasant. Under present conditions, grain surpluses in the hands of the kulak is a means of economically and politically strengthening the kulak elements. Therefore, by taking these grain surpluses from the kulaks, we not only facilitate the supply of grain to the towns and the Red Army, but we also destroy a means of strengthening the kulaks economically and politically.

    What must be done to obtain these grain surpluses? We must, first of all, abolish the harmful and dangerous mentality of letting matters take their own course. Grain procurements must be organized. The poor- and middle-peasant masses must

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be mobilized against the kulaks, and their public support organized for the measures of the Soviet government to increase grain procurements. The significance of the Urals-Siberian method of grain procurement, which is based on the principle of self-imposed obligations, lies precisely in the fact that it makes it possible to mobilize the labouring strata of the rural population against the kulaks for the purpose of increasing grain procurements. Experience has shown that this method gives us good results. Experience has shown that these good results are obtained in two directions: firstly, we extract the grain surpluses from the well-to-do strata of the rural population and thereby help to supply the country; secondly, we mobilize on this basis the poor- and middle-peasant masses against the kulaks, educate them politically and organize them into a vast, powerful, political army supporting us in the countryside. Certain comrades fail to realize the importance of this latter factor. Yet it is one of the important results, if not the most important result, of the Urals-Siberian method of grain procurement.

    It is true that this method is sometimes coupled with the employment of emergency measures against the kulaks, which evokes comical howls from Bukharin and Rykov. But what is wrong with it? Why should we not, sometimes, under certain conditions, employ emergency measures against our class enemy, against the kulaks? Why is it regarded as permissible to arrest speculators in the towns by hundreds and exile them to the Turukhansk region, but not permissible to take the grain surpluses from the kulaks -- who are speculating in grain and trying to seize the Soviet government by the throat and to enslave the poor peasants -- by methods of public compulsion and at prices at which Lhe poor and middle peasants sell their grain to our procurement organizations? Where is the logic in

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this? Has our Party ever declared that it is opposed in principle to the employment of emergency measures against speculators and kulaks? Have we no laws against speculators?

    Evidently, Rykov and Bukharin are opposed in principle to any employment of emergency measures against the kulaks. But that is bourgeois-liberal policy, not Marxist policy. Surely you know that, after the introduction of the New Economic Policy, Lenin even expressed himself in favour of a return to the policy of Poor Peasants' Committees, under certain conditions of course. And what indeed is the partial employment of emergency measures against the kulaks? Not even a drop in the ocean compared with the policy of Poor Peasants' Committees.

    The adherents of Bukharin's group hope to persuade the class enemy voluntarily to forego his interests and voluntarily to deliver his grain surpluses to us. They hope that the kulak, who has grown stronger, who is speculating, who is able to hold out by selling other products and who conceals his grain surpluses -- they hope that this kulak will give us his grain surpluses voluntarily at our procurement prices. Have they lost their senses? Is it not obvious that they do not understand the mechanics of the class struggle, that they do not know what classes are?

    Do they know how the kulaks jeer at our officials and the Soviet governmcnt at village meetings called to promote grain procurements? Have they heard of such facts as, for instance, what happened in Kazakhstan, when one of our agitators tried for two hours to persuade the holders of grain to deliver grain for supplying the country, and a kulak stepped forward with a pipe in his mouth and said: "Do us a little dance, young fellow, and I will let you have a couple of poods of grain."

    Voices : The swine!

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    Stalin : Try to persuade people like that.

    Class is class, comrades. You cannot get away from that truth. The Urals-Siberian method is a good one for the very reason that it helps to rouse the poor- and middle-peasant strata against the kulaks, it helps to smash the resistance of the kulaks and compels them to deliver the grain surpluses to the Soviet government bodies.

    The most fashionable word just now among Bukharin's group is the word "excesses" in grain procurements. That word is the most current commodity among them, since it helps them to mask their opportunist line. When they want to mask their own line they usually say: We, of course, are not opposed to pressure being brought to bear upon the kulak, but we are opposed to the excesses which are being committed in this sphere and which hurt the middle peasant. They then go on to relate stories of the "horrors" of these excesses; they read letters from "peasants," panic-stricken letters from comrades, such as Markov, and then draw the conclusion: the policy of bringing pressure to bear upon the kulaks must be abandoned.

    How do you like that? Because excesses are committed in carrying out a correct policy, that correct policy, it seems, must be abandoned. That is the usual trick of the opportunists: on the pretext that excesses are committed in carrying out a correct line, abolish that line and replace it by an opportunist line. Moreover, the supporters of Bukharin's group very carefully hush up the fact that there is another kind of excesses, more dangerous and more harmful, -- namely, excesses in the direction of merging with the kulak, in the direction of adaptation to the well-to-do strata of the rural population, in the direction of abandoning the revolutionary policy of the Party for the opportunist policy of the Right deviators.

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    Of course, we are all opposed to those excesses. None of us wants the blows directed against the kulaks to hurt the middle peasants. That is obvious, and there can be no doubt about it. But we are most emphatically opposed to the chatter about excesses, in which Bukharin's group so zealously indulges, being used to scuttle the revolutionary policy of our Party and replace it by the opportunist policy of Bukharin's group. No, that trick of theirs won't work.

    Point out at least one political measure taken by the Party that has not been accompanied by excesses of one kind or another. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that we must combat excesses. But can one on these grounds decry the line itself, which is the only correct line?

    Take a measure like the introduction of the seven-hour day. There can be no doubt that this is one of the most revolutionary measures carried out by our Party in the recent period. Who does not know that this measure, which by its nature is a profoundly revolutionary one, is frequently accompanied by excesses, sometimes of a most objectionable kind? Does that mean that we ought to abandon the policy of introducing the seven-hour day?

    Do the supporters of the Bukharin opposition understand what a mess they are getting into in playing up the excesses committed during the grain-procurement campaign?

    Lastly, a few words about grain imports and our reserves of foreign currency. I have already mentioned the fact that Rykov and his close friends several times raised the question of importing grain from abroad. At first Rykov spoke of the need to import some 80-I00 million poods of grain. This would require about 200 million rubles' worth of foreign cur-

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rency. Later, he raised the question of importing 50 million poods, that is, for 100 million rubles' worth of foreign currency. We rejected this suggestion, as we had come to the conclusion that it was preferable to bring pressure to bear upon the kulaks and wring out of them their quite substantial grain surpluses, rather than expend foreign currency earmarked for imports of equipment for our industry.

    Now Rykov makes a change of front. Now he asserts that the capitalists are offering us grain on credit, but that we refuse to take it. He said that several telegrams had passed through his hands, telegrams showing that the capitalists are willing to let us have grain on credit. Moreover, he tried to make it appear that there are people in our ranks who refuse to accept grain on credit either owing to a whim or for some other inexplicable reasons.

    That is all nonsense, comrades. It would be absurd to imagine that the capitalists in the West have suddenly begun to take pity on us, that they are willing to give us some tens of millions of poods of grain practically free of charge or on long-term credit. That is nonsense, comrades.

    What is the point then? The point is that for the past six months various capitalist groups have been probing us, probing our financial possibilities, our financial standing, our endurance. They approach our trade representatives in Paris, Czechoslovakia, America and the Argentine with offers of grain on very short-term credit, not exceeding three, or, at the most, six months. Their object is not so much to sell us grain on credit, as to find out whether our position is really very difficult, whether our financial possibilities are really exhausted, or, whether our financial position is strong, and whether we will snatch at the bait that they have thrown out.

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    There are big disputes going on now in the capitalist world on the subject of our financial possibilities. Some say that we are already bankrupt, and that the fall of Soviet power is a matter of a few months, if not weeks. Others say that this is not true, that Soviet power is firmly rooted, has financial possibilities and sufficient grain.

    At the present time our task is to display the requisite hrmness and stamina, not to succumb to mendacious promises of grain on credit, and to show the capitalist world that we shall manage without importing grain. That is not just my personal opinion. That is the opinion of the majority of the Political Bureau.

    For this reason we decided to decline the offer of philanthropists of the Nansen type to import into the U.S.S.R. a million dollars' worth of grain on credit.

    For the same reason we gave a negative answer to all those intelligence agents of the capitalist world in Paris, America and Czechoslovakia, who were offering us a small quantity of grain on credit.

    For the same reason we decided to exercise the utmost economy in grain consumption, and the maximum degree of organizing efficiency in grain procurement.

    By doing so, we sought to achieve two aims: on the one hand to do without importing grain and thus keep our foreign currency for importing equipment, and, on the other hand, to show all our enemies that we stand on firm ground and have no intention of succumbing to promises of alms.

    Was this policy correct? I believe that it was the only correct policy. It was correct not only because we found here, within our own country, new possibilities of obtaining grain. It was correct, too, because by managing without grain imports and by sweeping aside the intelligence agents of the capitalist

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world, we have strengthened our international position, improved our financial standing and exploded all idle chatter about "the impending collapse" of Soviet power.

    The other day we held certain preliminary talks with representatives of German capitalists. They are promising us a 500 million credit, and it looks as though they in fact consider it necessary to grant us this credit so as to ensure Soviet orders for their industry.

    A few days ago we had the visit of a delegation of British Conservatives, who also consider it necessary to recognize the stability of Soviet power and the expediency of granting us credits so as to ensure Soviet orders for their industry.

    I believe that we would not have had these new possibilities of obtaining credits, in the first place from the Germans, and then from one group of British capitalists, if we had not displayed the necessary firmness that I spoke of earlier.

    Consequently, the point is not that we are refusing some imaginary grain on imaginary long-term credit because of an alleged whim. The point is that we must be able to size up our enemies, to discern their real desires, and to display the stamina necessary for consolidating our international position.

    That, comrades, is the reason why we have refused to import grain.

    As you see, the question of grain imports is far from being as simple as Rykov would have us believe. The question of grain imports is one that concerns our international position.

    Thus we have reviewed all the principal questions relating to our disagreements in the sphere of theory as well as in the

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sphere of the policy of the Comintern and the internal policy of our Party. From what has been said it is apparent that Rykov's statement about the existence of a single line does not correspond to the real state of affairs. From what has been said it is apparent that we have in fact two lines. One line is the general line of the Party, the revolutionary Leninist line of our Party. The other line is the line of Bukharin's group. This second line has not quite crystallized yet, partly because of the incredible confusion of views within the ranks of Bukharin's group, and partly because this second line, being of little im portance in the Party, tries to disguise itself in one way or another. Nevertheless, as you have seen, this line exists, and it exists as a line which is distinct from the Party line, as a line opposed to the general Party line on almost all questions of our policy. This second line is that of the Right deviation.

    Let us pass now to questions of Party leadership.

    Bukharin said that there is no opposition within our Party, that Bukharin's group is not an opposition. That is not true, comrades. The discussion at the plenum showed quite clearly that Bukharin's group constitutes a new opposition. The oppositional work of this group consists in attempts to revise the Party line; it seeks to revise the Party line and is preparing the ground for replacing the Party line by another line, the line of the opposition, which can be nothing but the line of the Right deviation.

    Bukharin said that the group of three does not constitute a factional group. That is not true, comrades. Bukharin's group has all the characteristics of a faction. There is the platform the factional secrecy, the policy of resigning, the organized

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struggle against the Central Committee. What more is required? Why hide the truth about the factionalism of Bukharin's group, when it is self-evident? The very reason why the plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission has met is to tell all the truth here about our disagreements. And the truth is that Bukharin's group is a factional group. And it is not merely a factional group, but -- I would say -- the most repulsive and the pettiest of all the factional groups that ever existed in our Party.

    This is evident if only from the fact that it is now attempting to use for its factional aims such an insignificant and petty affair as the disturbances in Adjaria. In point of fact, what does the so-called "revolt" in Adjaria amount to in comparison with such revolts as the Kronstadt revolt? I believe that in comparison with this the so-called "revolt" in Adjaria is not even a drop in the ocean. Were there any instances of Trotskyites or Zinovievites attempting to make use of the serious revolt which occurred in Kronstadt to combat the Central Committee, the Party? It must be admitted, comrades, that there were no such instances. On the contrary, the opposition groups which existed in our Party at the time of that serious revolt helped the Party in suppressing it, and they did not dare to make use of it against the Party.

    Well, and how is Bukharin's group acting now? You have already had evidence that it is attempting in the pettiest and most offensive way to utilize against the Party the microscopic "revolt" in Adjaria. What is this if not an extreme degree of factional blindness and factional degeneration?

    Apparently, it is being demanded of us that no disturbances should occur in our border regions which have common frontiers with capitalist countries. Apparently, it is being demanded of us that we should carry out a policy which would satisfy

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all classes of our society, the rich and the poor, the workers and the capitalists. Apparently, it is being demanded of us that there should be no discontented elements. Have not these comrades from Bukharin's group gone out of their minds?

    How can anybody demand of us, people of the proletarian dictatorship who are waging a struggle against the capitalist world, both inside and outside our country, that there should be no discontented elements in our country, and that disturbances should not sometimes occur in certain border regions which have common frontiers with hostile countries? For what purpose then does the capitalist encirclement exist, if not to enable international capital to apply all its efforts to organize actions by discontented elements in our border regions against the Soviet regime? Who, except empty-headed liberals, would raise such demands? Is it not obvious that factional pettiness can sometimes produce in people a typically liberal blindness and narrow-mindedness?

    Rykov assured us here that Bukharin is one of the most "irreproachable" and "loyal" Party members in his attitude towards the Central Committee of our Party.

    I am inclined to doubt it. We cannot take Rykov's word for it. We demand facts. And Rykov is unable to supply facts.

    Take, for example, such a fact as the negotiations Bukharin conducted behind the scenes with Kamenev's group, which is connected with the Trotskyites; the negotiations about setting up a factional bloc, about changing the policy of the Central Committee, about changing the composition of the Political Bureau, about using the grain-procurement crisis for attacking the Central Committee. The question arises: Where is Bu-

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kharin's "loyal" and "irreproachable" attitude towards his Central Committee?

    Is not such behaviour, on the contrary, a violation of any kind of loyalty to his Central Committee, to his Party, on the part of a member of the Political Bureau? If this is called loyalty to the Central Committee, then what is the word for betrayal of one's Central Committee?

    Bukharin likes to talk about loyalty and honesty, but why does he not try to examine his own conscience and ask himself whether he is not violating in the most dishonest manner the elementary requirements of loyalty to his Central Committee when he conducts secret negotiations with Trotskyites against his Central Committee and thereby betrays his Central Committee?

    Bukharin spoke here about the lack of collective leadership in the Central Committee of the Party, and assured us that the requirements of collective leadership were being violated by the majority of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee.

    Our plenum, of course, has put up with everything. It can even tolerate this shameless and hypocritical assertion of Bukharin's. But one must have really lost all sense of shame to make so bold as to speak in this way at the plenum against the majority of the Central Committee.

    In truth, how can we speak of collective leadership if the majority of the Central Committee, having harnessed itself to the chariot of state, is straining all its forces to move it forward and is urging Bukharin's group to give a helping hand in this arduous task, while Bukharin's group is not only not helping its Central Committee but, on the contrary, is hampering it in every way, is putting a spoke in its wheels, is threaten-

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ing to resign, and comes to terms with enemies of the Party, with Trotskyites, against the Central Committee of our Party?

    Who, indeed, but hypocrites can deny that Bukharin, who is setting up a bloc with the Trotskyites against the Party, and is betraying his Central Committee, does not want to and will not implement collective leadership in the Central Committee of our Party?

    Who, indeed, but the blind can fail to see that if Bukharin nevertheless chatters about collective leadership in the Central Committee, putting the blame on the majority of the Central Committee, he is doing so with the object of disguising his treacherous conduct?

    Bukharin spoke here of the "civil execution" of three members of the Political Bureau, who, he says, "were being hauled over the coals" by the organizations of our Party. He said that the Party had subjected these three members of the Political Bureau -- Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky -- to "civil execution" by criticizing their errors in the press and at meetings, while they, the three members of the Political Bureau, were "compelled" to keep silent.

    All that is nonsense, comrades. Those are the false words of a Communist gone liberal who is trying to weaken the Party in its fight against the Right deviation. According to Bukha-

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rin, if he and his friends have become entangled in Right deviationist mistakes, the Party has no right to expose those mistakes, the Party must stop fighting the Right deviation and wait until it shall please Bukharin and his friends to renounce their mistakes.

    Is not Bukharin asking too much from us? Is he not under the impression that the Party exists for him, and not he for the Party? Who is compelling him to keep silent, to remain in a state of inaction when the whole Party is mobilized against the Right deviation and is conducting determined attacks against difficulties? Why should not he, Bukharin, and his close friends come forward now and engage in a determined fight against the Right deviation and conciliation towards it? Can anyone doubt that the Party would welcome Bukharin and his close friends if they decided to take this not so difficult step? Why do they not decide to take this step, which, after all, is their duty? Is it not because they place the interests of their group above the interests of the Party and its general line? Whose fault is it that Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky are missing in the fight against the Right deviation? Is it not obvious that talk about the "civil execution" of the three members of the Political Bureau is a poorly camouflaged attempt on the part of the three members of the Political Bureau to compel the Party to keep silent and to stop fighting against the Right deviation?

    The fight against the Right deviation must not be regarded as a secondary task of our Party. The fight against the Right deviation is one of the most decisive tasks of our Party. If we, in our own ranks, in our own Party, in the political General Staff of the proletariat, which is directing the movement and is leading the proletariat forward -- if we in this General

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Staff should allow the free existence and the free functioning of the Right deviators, who are trying to demobilize the Party, demoralize the working class, adapt our policy to the tastes of the "Soviet" bourgeoisie, and thus yield to the difficulties of our socialist construction -- if we should allow all this, what would it mean? Would it not mean that we are ready to put a brake on the revolution, disrupt our socialist construction, flee from difficulties, and surrender our positions to the capitalist elements?

    Does Bukharin's group understand that to refuse to fight the Right deviation is to betray the working class, to betray the revolution?

    Does Bukharin's group understand that unless we overcome the Right deviation and conciliation towards it, it will be impossible to overcome the difficulties facing us, and that unless we overcome these difficulties it will be impossible to achieve decisive successes in socialist construction?

    In view of this, what is the worth of this pitiful talk about the "civil execution" of three members of the Political Bureau?

    No, comrades, the Bukharinites will not frighten the Party with liberal chatter about "civil execution." The Party demands that they should wage a determined fight against the Right deviation and conciliation towards it side by side with all the members of the Central Committee of our Party. It demands this of Bukharin's group in order to help to mobilize the working class, to break down the resistance of the class enemies and to organize decisive victory over the difficulties of our socialist construction.

    Either the Bukharinites will fulfil this demand of the Party, in which case the Party will welcome them, or they will not do so, in which case they will have only themselves to blame.

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    I pass to the conclusions.

    I submit the following proposals:

    1) We must first of all condemn the views of Bukharin's group. We must condemn the views of this group as set forth in its declarations and in the speeches of its representatives, and state that these views are incompatible with the Party line and fully coincide with the position of the Right deviation.

    2) We must condemn Bukharin's secret negotiations with Kamenev's group as the most flagrant expression of the disloyalty and factionalism of Bukharin's group.

    3) We must condemn the policy of resigning that was being practised by Bukharin and Tomsky, as a gross violation of the elementary requirements of Party discipline.

    4) Bukharin and Tomsky must be removed from their posts and warned that in the event of the slightest attempt at insubordination to the decisions of the Central Committee, the latter will be forced to exclude both of them from the Political Bureau.

    5) We must take appropriate measures forbidding members and candidate members of the Political Bureau, when speaking publicly, to deviate in any way from the line of the Party and the decisions of the Central Committee or of its bodies.

    6) We must take appropriate measures so that press organs, both Party and Soviet, newspapers as well as periodicals, should fully conform to the line of the Party and the decisions of its leading bodies.

    7) We must adopt special provisions, including even expulsion from the Central Committee and from the Party,

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for persons who attempt to violate the confidential nature of the decisions of the Party, its Central Committee and Political Bureau.