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edly endorse, are approximately as follows: The oil region (Balakhany, Romany, Sabunchi, Surakhany and Bibi-Eibat) is to form a Zemstvo unit separate from the city and the uyezd, to be called the oil field local government body. The functions of the oil field local government body are to cover: water supply, lighting, road building, tramways, medical assistance, people's halls, schools, erection of slaughter-houses and baths, workers' settlements, etc. In general the local government body is to be organised in conformity with the "regulations" of June 12, 1890,[84] with the difference, however, that according to these "regulations" half the seats in the Zemstvo are guaranteed to the nobility, whereas here, owing to the absence of members of the nobility (by separating the oil region from the uyezd the oil owners have insured themselves against the predominance of the landowners and have established their own predominance) this proportion of seats is guaranteed not even to all the oil owners, but to 23 of the biggest. Of the 46 seats in this local government body, 6 are allocated to representatives of government departments and public institutions, 4 to the working population numbering 100,000, 18 to the group paying two-thirds of all the taxes, i.e., to 23 of the biggest oil owners (the total budget is to amount to about 600,000 rubles per annum), 9 to the group paying one-sixth of the taxes, i.e., 140 to 150 medium oil owners who are in vassal dependence upon the big ones, and the remaining 9 seats are to go to the petty trading and industrial bourgeoisie (about 1,400 persons).

    As you see, we have before us, first, the privileged capitalists, and second, a purely industrial Zemstvo,

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which is bound to become the arena of sharp conflicts between labour and capital.

    By setting up a Zemstvo of precisely this character the oil owners want: firstly, to shift most of the cultural and municipal functions from their "congress" to the oil field local government body and thus convert the "congress" into a pure syndicate; secondly, to pass on some of the expenditure on the needs of the oil-field working population to the rest of the bourgeoisie, the owners of auxiliary enterprises, boring contractors, etc. As regards the allocation of four seats to the workers, who will elect "in conformity with the regulations governing the Third State Duma" (delegates to be elected by the workers' curia who are to elect four electors), this, far from being a sacrifice on the part of the oil owners, is very much to their advantage: four workers' representatives as window-dressing for the local government body is so "liberal" and . . . so cheap, that the oil kings can readily concede this.

    On the other hand, there can be no doubt that in so far as the oil field local government body will unite the oil bourgeoisie and the "auxiliary" bourgeoisie, so to speak, it must also unite the hitherto disunited oil industry workers and the workers in the auxiliary enterprises and give them the opportunity to voice their common demands through their four representatives.

    Taking all this into account, the Baku Committee, in its resolution on oil field local government, decided to utilise the proposed scheme of local government by participating in it for the purpose of conducting agitation for the general economic needs of the workers and of strengthening the latter's organisation.

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    Further, with a view to expanding the electoral system, and bearing in mind that the oil field local government body will, in general, deal with the same questions that excite the workers as those which the conferences hitherto called dealt with -- and in the latter the workers always had equal representation with the oil owners -- the organisation is demanding in its resolution equal representation for the workers in the local government body, emphasising in this resolution that the struggle inside the local government body will be effective only to the extent that it is backed by the struggle outside the local government body and serves the interests of that struggle.

    Moreover, in view of the fact that the decision of the gubernia conference to exclude from the oil field local government area the villages of Balakhany, Sabunchi and Romany -- which are actually workers' settlements -- is disadvantageous to the workers, the organisation is demanding that these villages be included in the oil field local government area.

    Lastly, in the general part of the resolution, pointing to universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage as an essential condition for the free development of local government bodies and for the free manifestation of existing class antagonisms, the Baku Committee emphasises the necessity of overthrowing the tsarist regime and of convening a popular Constituent Assembly as a preliminary condition for the creation of consistently democratic local government bodies. . . .

    Oil field local government is still in the formative stage. The scheme proposed by the oil owners' commission has yet to be endorsed by the oil owners' congress, after which it must be submitted to the Ministry of the

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Interior through the Viceroy's office, after that to the State Duma, etc. Nevertheless, the organisation decided to launch a campaign forthwith, and to convene meetings in the oil fields and at the works for the purpose of exposing the oil owners, of popularising our platform among the broad masses and of agitating for a popular Constituent Assembly. With the same objects in view it will not reject either "participation " in the oil owners ' congress or utilisation of the floor of the Duma, and will supply our group in the Duma with the necessary materials.

    In view of certain specifically Baku conditions prevailing in the oil fields (some possibility of holding meetings not yet entirely destroyed by the authorities, the existence of the oil field and works commissions), the state of the organisation in Baku differs favourably from the state of the organisations in other parts of Russia. Furthermore, the existence of so-called legal possibilities also facilitates our work. As a consequence, the organisation has fairly considerable connections. But these connections are not being utilised owing to a shortage of forces and funds. Oral, and more especially printed, agitation must be conducted in the Tatar, Armenian and Russian languages, but, owing to the shortage of funds (and forces) we are obliged to confine ourselves to the Russian language, although the Moslem workers, for example, occupy the most important post in the industry (bailing) and they are relatively more numerous than the Russians or Armenians. Bakinsky Proletary (the organ of the Baku Committee)[85] which is published in Russian, has not come out for three

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months owing, chiefly, to the absence of funds. At its last meeting the Baku Committee accepted the proposal of the Tiflis Committee to publish a joint organ, if possible in four, or three, languages (Russian, Tatar, Georgian and Armenian). The membership (in the strict sense of the term) of our organisation does not exceed 300. Amalgamation with the Menshevik comrades (about 100 members) has not yet entered the phase of accomplishment -- so far only wishes are observable, but the split cannot be liquidated by wishes alone. . . . Propaganda is being conducted only in the advanced study circles, which we here call "discussion groups." The system is one of lectures. A great shortage of serious propaganda literature is felt. . . . Isolation from the Party and complete lack of information about what the Party organisations in Russia are doing have a bad effect upon the Party membership. An all-Russian organ, regular general Party conferences, and systematic tours by members of the Central Committee could help matters. Of the decisions of a general organisational character adopted by the Baku Committee, the most important are the following two: on a general Party conference, and on an all-Russian organ.* On the first question, the Baku Committee considers that it is necessary to convene a conference at the earliest possible date to settle urgent, mainly organisational, questions. The Baku Committee also considers that it is necessary to convene, parallel with this conference, a conference of Bolsheviks to liquidate the abnormal situation that has existed within the group for the past few months. On the second question the Baku

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Committee, noting the isolation of the organisations from one another, and believing that only an all-Russian organ published in Russia can link up the Party organisations into a single whole, proposes that the Party should set to work to organise such a newspaper.

    The influence of the unions upon the masses is considerable, especially that of the union of the "oil industry workers," and this automatically facilitates the task of uniting the most active elements around our organisation.

    Of the other "legal possibilities," those worthy of attention are the clubs (under Social-Democratic influence) and the "Trud" consumers' co-operative society[86] (under Socialist-Revolutionary and Social-Democratic influence), both being centres where the most active elements of the Baku proletariat are concentrated. Concerning their attitude towards the organisation, especially the attitude of the "Znanie-Sila" club,[87]which operates in all the oil districts (the "Nauka" club operates only in the town), the same may be said as about the unions. . . .

    The past two weeks were taken up with the temperance campaign, which called for the activity of nearly all the legal organisations. The stand taken by the Baku Committee on this question is expressed in its resolution. In the latter, drunkenness is regarded as an in evitable evil under capitalism, which can be abolished only with the fall of capitalism and the triumph of socialism. By reducing the workers and peasants to the condition of rightless slaves and robbing them of the opportunity to satisfy their cultural requirements, the existing autocratic-feudal regime helps to spread drunkenness among the toiling population to the utmost degree. This is apart from the fact that representatives of the "authorities" deliberately encourage drunkenness

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as a source of revenue for the Treasury. In view of all this, the Baku Committee maintains that neither the sermons preached by the "liberals," who convene congresses to combat drunkenness and organise "temperance societies," nor the exhortations of priests can diminish, let alone abolish, drunkenness, which is engendered by the inequalities in society, and intensified by the autocratic regime. All that is possible and necessary within the framework of the capitalist system is a struggle with the object not of abolishing drunkenness, but of reducing it to a minimum. But for such a struggle to be successful it is first of all necessary to overthrow the tsarist regime and to win a democratic republic, which will create the possibility for the free development of the class struggle and for the organisation of the proletariat in town and country, for raising its cultural level and for widely training its forces for the great struggle for socialism. The Baku Committee regards the forthcoming congress to combat drunkenness[88] as a means of agitating for the democratic and socialist demands of the Russian proletariat, and instructs our delegate to combat the opportunist delegates at the congress who obscure the class tasks of the proletariat. . . .

December 20

First published in Sotsial-Demokrat, No. 11, February 13 (26), 1910 Signed: K. S. The section "Legal Possibilities" was written on December 20, 1909 Signed: K. Stefin

Reprinted from the newspaper. The section "Legal Possibilities" reprinted from the manuscript.

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    The organ in which Menshevik "public opinion" finds expression is the Georgian Menshevik press. The credo of the Tiflis Mensheviks is expressed in the articles "Questions of the Day" (see issues of the Azri and Dasatskisi [89]). The author of these articles is the most influential of the Tiflis Mensheviks, Comrade An.[90]

    Let us proceed to review these articles, which provided the ideological ground for Liquidationism in Tiflis.

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    In the above-mentioned articles the author under takes a "revaluation of all values" and arrives at the conclusion that the Party (and the Bolsheviks in particular) has erred in certain theses of its programme, especially its tactical theses. In the author's opinion, it is necessary "radically to change the entire tactics of the Party" in order to make it possible "to unite the forces of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat" -- the sole guarantee of victory for the revolution. But let the author himself speak.

    "The Bolsheviks argued," says the author, "that it (the proletariat) must carry out (in the bourgeois revolution) its entire minimum programme. But the carrying out of the social section of this minimum would fetter bourgeois production, would rouse the protest of the entire bourgeoisie, and lay the basis for a gigantic counter-revolution. . . . Who will dare assert that the introduction of an eight-hour day harmonises with the interests of the present-day undeveloped bourgeoisie?" Clearly, "the carrying out of the Bolshevik minimum programme is mere declamation" (see Azri, No. 17, February 1908).

    Of course, the Bolsheviks were not the only ones to talk about carrying out the entire minimum programme, and history knows of no Bolshevik minimum programme, it knows only of the minimum programme of the whole Party -- but that is not the point of interest just now. The important thing is that in view of "the undeveloped state of the bourgeoisie" and the danger of counter-revolution that follows from it, our author rises in arms against the "social section" of the programme as "mere declamation," which, evidently, ought to be liquidated.

    No analysis of the actual state of industry (Comrade An, obviously, uses incorrect terms in describing the backwardness of industry as the "undeveloped state of

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the bourgeoisie" -- K. St.), no figures, nothing like serious data, are to be found in Comrade An's articles. He simply starts out with the bare proposition that the bourgeoisie will not tolerate the introduction of an eight-hour day, and yet, without the "union of the forces of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie," the victory of the revolution is impossible -- hence, down with the "social section" of the programme. . . .

    We shall not attempt to prove the absurdity of the author's assertions, which the liberals of our times advance against Social-Democrats every now and again. In our opinion it is quite sufficient to quote them to be able at once to grasp the nature of the Tiflis Mensheviks. . . .

    But our author rises in arms not only against the "social section" of the programme. He does not spare its political section either, although he does not attack it so bluntly and openly. Let us hear what he says:

    "The struggle of the proletariat alone, or of the bourgeoisie* alone, will under no circumstances smash the reaction. . . . Clearly, the union of their forces, their combination in one form or another, and their direction towards one common goal is the only path (our italics) to victory over the reaction.". . . "The defeat of the reaction, the winning of a constitution and the putting of the latter into effect, depends upon the conscious union of the forces of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat and their direction towards a common goal.". . . Moreover, "the proletariat must march in such a way as not to weaken the general movement by its uncompromising attitude." But as "the immediate demand of the bourgeoisie can consist only of a moderate constitution," obviously it is the duty of the proletariat to cast aside its "radical constitu-

    Comrade An is particularly displeased with the Party's tactics, which, in his opinion, must be "radically changed" (see Dasatskisi, No 4). He therefore devotes the greater part of his articles to a criticism of these tactics. He particularly attacks the well-known "Plekhanov formula" ("the revolution in Russia will be victorious as a workers' movement, or will not be victorious at all"[91]), identifies it with the proposition about the hegemony of the proletariat and decides that it does not stand criticism. He proposes that this "formula" be replaced by a "new" (old!) proposition about "uniting the forces of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat" in the interests of the "general movement" . . . "towards one common goal."

    Listen to this:

    "The proposition concerning the leading role of the proletariat in the bourgeois revolution is justified neither by Marx's theory nor by historical facts."

    The appeal to theory:

    "The proletariat cannot with its own hands build up the system of its own enemies. Hence, the leadership of the bourgeois revolution by the proletariat is impossible."

    The appeal to historical facts:

    "Our revolution was at the same time our workers' movement, but in spite of that the revolution was not victorious. Clearly, Plekhanov's formula proved to be wrong" (see Azri, No. 17).

    Short and clear. We can only feel sorry for German Social-Democracy which admitted (frivolously no doubt!) in its letter of greeting to the London Congress that

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the leading role of the proletariat in our revolution is fully proved both by "Marx's theory" and by "historical facts." We shall say nothing about our (unhappy!) Party. . . .

    What does our author substitute for the leading role of the proletariat? What does he offer in its place?

    "The struggle of the proletariat alone," says Comrade An, "or of the bourgeoisie alone, will under no circumstances smash the reaction. . . . Clearly, the union of their forces, their combination in one form or another, and their direction towards one common goal is the only path to victory over the reaction." Moreover, "the proletariat must march in such a way as not to weaken the general movement by its uncompromising attitude". . . (see Dasatskisi, No. 4). For, the author assures us, "the weaker the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie the more victorious (all italics ours -- K. St.) is the bourgeois revolution, other conditions being equal, of course" (see Azri, No. 15).

    What "other equal conditions" the author is referring to -- Allah knows! Only one thing is clear, and that is, that he is advocating a weakening of the class struggle in the interests . . . of the revolution. The proposition, confirmed by the experience of our entire revolution, that the more this revolution rests on the class struggle of the proletariat, which leads the rural poor against the landlords and the liberal bourgeoisie, the more complete will the victory of the revolution be -- this proposition has remained for our author a secret sealed with seven seals. The only guarantee of the triumph of the revolution that Comrade An can see is: "The union of the forces of the proletariat with the forces of the bourgeoisie."

    But what is this bourgeoisie in whom our author reposes such great hopes? Listen:

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    "The reactionaries," says our author, "are exceptionally vigorous in fighting the Cadet Party . . . because . . . the future masters of Russia will spring from that very middle class whose ideology the Cadets express. Political power can be wrested from the reactionaries only by the middle bourgeoisie, which has matured for the function of ruling; this class is their direct competitor, and that is why the reactionaries fear it more than any other." In general, "in all revolutions the reactionary class did not fear the revolutionaries as much as it feared the moderate bourgeoisie. Why? Because only that class takes the reins of government out of the hands of the old regime, as we said above. Hence, thanks to its moderate constitution it is this class that is destined to make the new system acceptable to the overwhelming majority and there by cut the ground from under the feet of the reaction" (see Azri, No. 24). But as "the bourgeoisie cannot establish the new system without the proletariat," "the proletariat will have to support the bourgeois opposition" (see Dasatskisi, No. 4).

    And so, it appears, the "moderate" Cadet bourgeoisie with its "moderate" monarchist constitution will save our revolution.

    And the peasantry, what is its role in the revolution?

    "Of course," says our author, "the peasantry will intervene in the movement and will lend it a spontaneous character, but only the two modern classes will play a decisive role": the moderate bourgeoisie and the proletariat (see Dasatskisi, No. 4).

    And so, it is no use counting much on the peasantry, it appears.

    Now everything is clear. For the triumph of the revolution we need the moderate Cadet bourgeoisie with a moderate constitution. But it cannot achieve victory alone, it needs the assistance of the proletariat. The proletariat must assist it because it has nobody to rely on -- not even on the peasantry -- except the moderate

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bourgeoisie. But for this it must cast aside its own uncompromising attitude and, extending a hand to the moderate bourgeoisie, wage a common struggle for a moderate Cadet constitution. All the rest will come of its own accord. A party which regards the struggle of the workers and peasants against the moderate bourgeoisie and the feudal landlords as a guarantee of the triumph of the revolution -- is making a mistake.

    In short, instead of the leading role of the proletariat which leads the peasants, we have the leading role of the Cadet bourgeoisie which leads the proletariat by the nose.

    Such are the "new" tactics of the Tiflis Mensheviks.

    There is no need, in our opinion, to analyse all this vile liberal rubbish. We need only observe that the "new" tactics of the Tiflis Mensheviks mean the liquidation of the Party's tactics, the correctness of which has been confirmed by the revolution, a liquidation which calls for the conversion of the proletariat into an appendage of the moderate Cadet bourgeoisie.

First published in Diskus-
sionny Listok. (Supplement
to Sotsial-Demokrat), No. 2,
May 25 (June 7), 1910

Signed: K. St.