It might seem rather simplistic to put the question like this: why does philosophy need to exist as a distinct thing? Why does it need to speak with the utmost care to distinguish itself from the sciences and from every other idea or social practice? Why, philosophy speaks only of them! Let us say that the question is not so simple. That philosophy feels the need to speak, or rather, assumes the responsibility of speaking and consigning what it has to say to separate, identifiable treatises, derives from the fact that, in its profound historical conviction, it considers it has an irreplaceable task to accomplish. This is to speak the Truth about all human practices and ideas. Philosophy believes that no one and nothing can speak in its name, and that if it did not exist, the world would be bereft of its Truth. Because for the world to exist, it is necessary for such truth to be spoken. This truth is logos, or origin, or meaning. And since there are common origins between logos and speech (between logos and legein, Truth and discourse, or, put another way, since the specific, stubborn existence of logos is not materiality or practice or any other form, but speech, voice, word), there is only one means of knowing logos, and hence Truth: the form of discourse. This intimacy between logos and speech means that truth, logos, can be entirely enclosed or captured and offered up only in the discourse of philosophy. For this reason philosophy can in no way transcend its own discourse. Accordingly, it is clear that its discourse is not a medium, or an intermediary between it and truth, but the very presence of truth as logos.
    But now the strange paradox of Marxist philosophy is upon us. Marxist philosophy exists, yet it has not been produced as philosophy in the sense we have just analysed. We do not need to go very far to be convinced of this. Apart from the brief sentences, brilliant and enigmatic, of the Theses on Feuerbach, which announced a philosophy that never arrived; apart from the scathing philosophical critiques in The Germany Ideology directed against the neo-Hegelians, who limited themselves to plunging all philosophy into the misty nothingness of ideology; and apart from the celebrated allusions to Hegel in the Postface to the second German edition of Capital, Marx left us no philosophical treatise or discourse. Twice, in two letters, he promised a score or so pages on the dialectic, but they never materialized; we may assume that they were scarcely easy to write. No doubt Engels left us his philosophical critique of Dühring, and Lenin his Materialism and Empirio-criticism - another critique. Many elements can doubtless be drawn from a critique, but how is it to be thought? How are we to structure it 'theoretically'? Are we dealing with the elements of a whole, albeit an absent whole, without effective presence - elements which it would suffice to re-elaborate according to traditional models, as in the case of Marxist philosophies that remain immersed in 'ontology'? Or, on the

 
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contrary, is it a question of elements which must be interrogated and deciphered, 'asked' precisely why they remain only, and uniquely, 'elements'? Of course, we also possess Lenin's Notebooks on Hegel. But the same questions arise here, too: what meaning can be given to simple reading notes, to these brilliant but enigmatic pointers? In short, we are forced to conclude in every instance that Marx, and even Engels and Lenin, left us nothing even remotely comparable to the classical forms of philosophical discourse.
    Now, the extent of this paradox still lies ahead of us. It resides in the fact that the absence of a philosophical discourse within Marxism has nevertheless produced prodigious philosophical effects. No one can deny that the philosophy we have inherited, the great classical philosophical tradition (from Plato to Descartes, from Kant to Hegel and Husserl), has been shaken in its very foundations (and in all its pretensions) by the impact of that ungraspable, almost formless encounter suddenly produced by Marx. Yet it never presented itself in the direct form of a philosophical discourse, but quite the reverse: in the form of a text like Capital. In other words, not a 'philosophical' text but a text in which the capitalist mode of production (and, through it, the structures of social formations) is investigated; a text, ultimately, which deals only with a scientific knowledge linked to the class struggle (a scientific knowledge which thus offers itself to us as simultaneously part of the proletarian class struggle - i.e. the very thing represented in Capital ). So: how do we grasp such a paradox?
    I would like to resolve this paradox by taking the shortest route, even if it is not exactly that of actual history.
    Hence, I would say at the outset that for all their brevity and incompletion, the Theses on Feuerbach contain the sketch of a cardinal suggestion. When Marx writes in Thesis I:

The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism (that of Feuerbach included) is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object, or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively),[1]

he no doubt employs formulae that can be interpreted in the sense of a transcendental philosophy of practice. And some have persisted in resorting to this active subjectivity, conceiving it as legitimizing a humanist philosophy, while Marx is referring to something different,

is utterly foreign to the logos, is not Truth and is irreducible to - does not realize itself in - speech or sight. Practice is a process of transformation which is always subject to its own conditions of existence and produces, not the Truth, but rather 'truths' (or the truth, let us say, of results or of knowledge, all within the field of its own conditions of existence). And if practice has agents, it nevertheless does not have a subject as the transcendental or ontological origin of its objective, its project; nor does it have a goal as the truth of its process. It is a process without subject or goal.[2]
    If we take the term Truth in its philosophical sense, from Plato to Hegel, and if we confront it with practice - a process without subject or goal, according to Marx - it must be affirmed that there is no truth of practice.
    Accordingly, there is a problem involved in assigning practice the role of Truth, of foundation, of origin, in a new philosophy that would be a philosophy of praxis (if I cite this expression it is not against Gramsci, who never envisaged this). Practice is not a substitute for Truth for the purposes of an immutable philosophy; on the contrary, it is what knocks philosophy off balance. Whether in the case of errant matter or the class struggle, practice is what philosophy, throughout its history, has never been able to incorporate. Practice is that other thing, on the basis of which it is possible not only to knock philosophy off balance, but also to begin to see clearly into the interior of philosophy.
    I suggested earlier that practice compels philosophy to recognize that it has an exterior. Maybe philosophy has not introduced into the domain of its thought the totality of what exists, including mud (of which Socrates spoke), or the slave (of which Aristotle spoke), or even the accumulation of riches at one pole and of misery at the other (of which Hegel spoke)? For Plato, philosophy observes the whole; for Hegel, philosophy thinks the whole. In fact, all the social practices are there in philosophy - not just money, wages, politics and the family, but all social ideas, morality, religion, science and art, in the same way that the stars are in the sky. If everything is there, if everything is perfectly collected and united in the interior of philosophy, where is its exterior space? Is it perhaps that the real world, the material world, does not exist for all philosophies? Berkeley, for example, was a bishop for whom, in Alain's phrase, 'the meal was already cooked'. Yet this bishop was a man like any other, and did not equivocate about the existence of 'roast beef', i.e.

 
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the existence of the external world.[3]
    In what, then, does this malign process operative in philosophy consist? In the interests of precision, there is a small nuance which must detain us here. In order to make all social practices and ideas enter its domain, and in order to impose itself upon these social practices and ideas with the aim of speaking their truth for them, philosophy plays tricks. That is, when philosophy absorbs and re-elaborates them in accordance with its own philosophical form, it scarcely does it with scrupulous respect for the reality (the particular nature) of such social practices and ideas. On the contrary, in affirming its power of Truth over them, philosophy compels them to undergo a veritable transformation, although this truth is usually imperceptible. What else can it do to adjust them to, and think them under, the unity of one and the same Truth? Nor is it necessary to proceed very far to be convinced of this: the same impulse is evident in Descartes vis-à-vis Galileo's physics (which is without a doubt something more than experimentation!); in Kant's little operation on chemistry and psychology; to say nothing of Plato's and Hegel's manoeuvres with morality and politics or economics. When confronted with the objection that it has an exterior space, philosophy is right to protest and to respond that it does not, since it takes command of everything. In truth, philosophy's exterior space must be sought within philosophy itself, in this appropriation of extra-philosophical space to which social practices are subjected, in this operation of exploitation, and hence deformation, of social practices that permits philosophy to unify such practices under the Truth.
    Philosophy's true exterior space, then, is within philosophy itself. In other words, this separation, this distance between the deformation and the actual practice, is the commitment to exist over and above such exploitation and transformation: it is resistance to philosophical violence.
    But the most important thing remains to be said. Because what has been said so far could be interpreted in terms of the will to power, accounting for the history of philosophy somewhat in Nietzsche's manner: at a given moment there existed men motivated by ressentiment who, wounded by the world, set about dominating it through thought - in short, making themselves the masters of the world, conceiving it exclusively through their own thought. The philosophers were precisely

these specialists in the violence of the concept, of Begriff, of appropriation, who asserted their power by subjecting to the law of Truth all the social practices of men, who became sadder and sadder and lived on in the night. We know that such a perspective is not foreign to some of our contemporaries who, naturally enough, discover in philosophy the archetype of power, the model of all power. They themselves write the equation knowledge = power and, in the style of modern and cultivated anarchists, affirm: violence, tyranny, state despotism are Plato's fault - just as they used to say a while back that the Revolution was Rousseau's fault.[4]
    The best way to respond to them is to go further than they do and introduce the scandalous fracture of practice into the very heart of philosophy. This is where Marx's influence is perhaps most profoundly felt.
    Hitherto we have let it be believed that philosophy was content to introduce the totality of human practices and ideas into its thought, in order to enunciate Truth with it. And we have provisionally assumed that if philosophy, having absorbed the totality of the social practices, deformed them, it was to a certain extent for logical and technical reasons - in order to be able to unify them. If we wish to add a certain number of objects to an already full suitcase, it is necessary to fold and deform them. If we wish to imagine the social practices under the unity of the Good, a large number of deformations will be required in order to mould them into this unity. Engels said something similar somewhere, when he asserted that all philosophy was systematic as a function of the 'imperishable desire of the human mind . . . to overcome all contradictions'.[5] Well, I do not think this is entirely correct. I think, rather, that these unifying or contradictory deformations uniquely concern the peculiar logic of philosophical discourse.
    I am perfectly well aware that in every philosopher, as in every mathematician who knows how to appreciate the elegance of a proof, there slumbers a lover of the arts, and there is no shortage of philosophers who have believed, with Kant, that the construction of a system was a question not only of logic, but of aesthetics as well. When logic does not suffice (or in order to make it digestible) a little aesthetics is thrown in - namely the Beautiful and the Good, which historically have

 
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had the habit of appearing in public together, so as to be noticed by polite society.
    But here we have to do with the foibles of philosophers, and one should not judge philosophy on the basis of them, just as mathematics should not be judged on the basis of the elegance of mathematicians.
    The truth is another thing: to reach it, not only must the psychology of philosophers be scorned, but also the illusion in which philosophy finds its repose: the illusion of its own power over the social practices. Because - and it is here that everything is decided - what is important is not that philosophy exercises power over social practices and ideas. What matters is that philosophy does not incorporate social practices under the unity of its thought in gratuitous fashion, but by removing the social practices from their own space, by subjecting this hierarchy to an internal order that constitutes its true unification.
    In other words, the world thought by philosophy is a unified world in so far as it is disarticulated and rearticulated - i.e. reordered - by philosophy. It is a world in which the different social practices, decomposed and recomposed, are distributed in a certain order of distinction and hierarchy which is significant. What makes it significant is not that philosophy dominates its objects but that it decomposes and recomposes them in a special order of internal hierarchy and distinction - an order which endows the whole operation of philosophy with significance. Of course, in order to realize this entire operation, in order to distribute its objects in this order, philosophy has to dominate them. Or, put another way, this necessity compels philosophy 'to take power' over them.
    But let us always bear in mind that 'power' never signifies 'power for power's sake', not even in the political arena. Quite the reverse: power is nothing other than what one does with it - that is, what it produces as a result. And if philosophy is that which 'sees the whole', it sees it only for the purposes of reordering it, i.e. imposing a determinate order upon the diverse elements of the whole.
    I cannot enter into details here. Thousands of examples could easily be offered, but let me rely on one that is unequivocal: the respective 'place' accorded by Descartes, Kant and Hegel to what they conceive of as morality and religion. Evidently, this 'place' (which is never identical in the totality of each of these systems) has profound repercussions upon each of their doctrines. Or, to take another more abstract example, let us recall how the presence of a theory of knowledge in Descartes and Kant, and its absence in Spinoza and Hegel, attest to their different treatments of scientific practice and derive from the overall orientation of each of these doctrines.
    I cannot go more deeply into this type of clarification now, but I do want to attend to one consequence of what has just been said. When the

 
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hypothesis is advanced that philosophy makes use of social practices and ideas in order to impose upon them a specific meaning in the interior of its system, it is clear that philosophy first has to decompose, and subsequently recompose, such practices. That is, philosophy needs to dissect the social practices in a certain way so that it can retain only those elements which it considers the most significant for its enterprise, subsequently recomposing such practices on the basis of those elements. Hence, starting from the reality of scientific practice, each philosopher fashions an idea of science; starting from the reality of ethical practice, an idea of morality; etc.
    This systematic deformation (let us be clear I intend deformation in the strongest sense of the word), provoked by the system (I mean not a logical system, but a system of domination, imposing a significance - a Truth - on the social practices), produces philosophical objects that resemble real objects, but are different from them. Only there is something more important still - namely: in order to cause the appearance of the Truth it wishes to impose in the interior of social practices or ideas, and in order to maintain the whole in one single block, philosophy finds itself obliged to invent what I would call philosophical objects, without a real, empirical referent - for example, Truth, Oneness, Totality, the cogito, the transcendental subject, and many other categories of the same kind that do not exist outside philosophy.
    Years ago I wrote: philosophy does not have an object in the sense that a science has an object; or, although philosophy has no object, there exist philosophical objects.[6] Philosophy has its objects within itself, and it works on them interminably. It modifies them, it takes them up again, it cannot do without them, because such philosophical objects (which are nothing more than the object of philosophy) are the means by which philosophy achieves its objectives, its mission: to impose upon the social practices and ideas that figure in its system the deformation imposed by the determinate order of that system. I was talking just now about the theory of knowledge and I said that its presence in Descartes and Kant, like its absence in Spinoza and Hegel, has a meaning: the theory of knowledge is one of those objects of philosophy which does not belong to anything but philosophy and vis-à-vis which philosophers can situate themselves. From the moment we encounter this object we are in the heart of what constitutes the peculiarity of philosophy, the objects that

 
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are its and its alone and in which all the destiny of its activity is played out.
    If we pursue this course, we will be in a better position to understand how practice irrupts to take philosophy from behind and to show that it has an exterior. Its exterior space, once again, is what takes place within it: not only logical deformations of the social practices in order to subject them to the non-contradictory formal unity of a systematic thought that encompasses the totality, but also dismemberment and reconstruction, the ordered rearrangement of these same deformed social practices - a double deformation, then, dictated by the exigencies of that ordering which ultimately dominates everything and imparts to philosophy its meaning.
    What might this meaning be? Because up to this point everything has taken place in written texts, in abstract discourses, that seem very distant from real social practices which only appear in philosophy in the form of categories and notions. Of course, this whole mental operation can satisfy its author with a beautiful conceptual unity, responding to his or her need for a 'search for truth'. After all, collectors and chess players are numerous. But what can this little private conceptual matter have to do with history, once its procedures are unmasked, once one no longer believes that it has any vocation to speak the Truth? In reality, this is where things get serious - and this we owe to Marx. What I am about to say is not entirely in Marx, of course, but without him we could not say it.
    No one will deny that, at least in certain areas, history knows perfectly well how to select and to recognize its own. And it is surely not fortuitous that this has consecrated the historical existence of philosophy. It is not by chance that philosophy survives, that these sacred abstract texts, interminably read and reread by generations of students, incessantly commented upon and glossed, can weather the storms and high seas of our cultural universe, to play their part in it. And since it is not the love of art that inspires their reading or fidelity to their history, if such texts survive, paradoxical as it may seem, it is because of the results they produce; and if they produce results, it is because these are required by the societies of our history.
    The whole question consists in knowing precisely what these results are and to what order they pertain. I want to warn the audience that what I am about to say cannot pretend to exhaust the subject. Like any other social and cultural reality, philosophy par excellence is over-determined. But I wish to foreground what I consider to be its essential determination, its determination in the last instance.
    Because we have hitherto forgotten a fundamentally important reality. To wit: philosophy, which pretends to enunciate the Truth of

 
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things once and for all, embodies this paradoxical characteristic of being, in its essence, conflictual, and perpetually so. Kant said of philosophy - the philosophy that preceded his own - that it was a battlefield.[7] And all the philosophers who preceded and succeeded him have proved him right, since they have never written anything which did not make war upon one or another of their predecessors. Thus philosophy (and with an insistence and a constancy so striking as to reveal its nature) is a perpetual war of ideas. Why this war? It cannot be put down to neurasthenia in susceptible personalities. The innumerable sub-philosophers, rule-of-thumb philosophers, or tear-out-your-hair philosophers (as Marx used to say), who entered the war out of sheer contrariness, as failed authors spoiling for a fight, have left no traces in history. But on the other hand, all those who have remained in history have done nothing more than fight among themselves, and, as shrewd combatants, knew how to find support against their principal adversary in the arguments of their secondary adversaries, how to make allies, bestowing insults and praise; adopting, in short, positions - and bellicose positions, without any ambiguity. It is on the basis of this general struggle that we must try to understand the results produced by the existence of historical philosophy. And this is where Marx's thought becomes decisive.
    In the Preface to the 1859 Contribution,[8] Marx ventured the idea that a social formation rests upon its economic infrastructure - that is, on the unity of the productive forces and the relations of production. In the infrastructure is rooted the class struggle, which pits the owners of the means of production against the directly exploited workers. And Marx added that above this infrastructure there was erected a whole superstructure, comprising law and the State on the one hand, and the ideologies on the other. The superstructure does nothing more than reflect the infrastructure. Evidently, life must be breathed into this topography, which offers a short cut in the history of a social formation, and it must be granted that if a social formation exists, in the strong sense, it is because it is capable, like every living being, of reproducing itself, but, unlike other living beings, of also reproducing its own conditions of existence. The material conditions of reproduction are secured by production itself, which also secures a considerable proportion of the conditions of reproduction of the relations of production. But the economic and political conditions of reproduction are secured by law and the State. As far as the ideologies are concerned, they participate in the relations of production and in the ensemble of social

 
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defend the idea that the action exercised upon the practices by ideology suffices to change their nature and general orientation. This because it is not ideology which is determinant in the last instance. Nevertheless, the efficacy of ideology is far from negligible. On the contrary, it can be quite considerable and (in keeping with real historical experiences) Marx therefore acknowledged its highly significant role in the reproduction and transformation of social relations. Ideology's potential effectivity upon the social practices can be formally conceived as that of conferring a certain unity and direction upon them at a given stage of the class struggle.
    If the set of ideologies is capable of such action, and if the peculiarity of philosophy consists in acting upon the ideologies and, through them, upon the ensemble of social practices and their orientation, then the raison d'être and scope of philosophy can be better appreciated.
    But I want to insist upon this point: its raison d'être is comprehensible only in formal terms, because as yet we have not understood why it is imperative for the set of ideologies to receive from philosophy, under the categories of Truth, this unity and its direction.
    In order to understand this it is necessary, in Marx's perspective, to introduce what I would call the political form of the existence of ideologies in the ensemble of social practices. It is necessary to foreground class struggle and the concept of the dominant ideology. If the society in question is a class society, political power - the power of the State - will be held by the exploiting class. To preserve its power (and this we knew long before Marx, ever since Machiavelli inaugurated political theory) the dominant class must transform its power from one based upon violence to one based upon consent. By means of the free and habitual consent of its subjects, such a dominant class needs to elicit an obedience that could not be maintained by force alone. This is the purpose served by the ever contradictory system of ideologies.
    This is what, following Gramsci, I have called the system of the Ideological State Apparatuses,[10] by which is meant the set of ideological, religious, moral, familial, legal, political, aesthetic, etc., institutions via which the class in power, at the same time as unifying itself, succeeds in imposing its particular ideology upon the exploited masses, as their own ideology. Once this occurs the mass of the people, steeped in the truth of the ideology of the dominant class, endorses its values (thus giving its consent to the existing order), and the requisite violence can either be dispensed with or utilized as a last resort.
    However, this state of affairs - which, other than in exceptional

concealing the fact that I am taking the risk of stating a very daring hypothesis. But I believe it is worth running the risk.
    When we observe the history of the Marxist workers' movement through the prism of the philosophical forms in which it has recognized itself, we encounter two typical situations. In the first we find ourselves with Marx, Engels, Lenin, Gramsci and Mao, who, in one way or another, always give the impression of distrusting like the plague anything that might appear to be a philosophy produced as such, as 'philosophy', in the forms of ideological hegemony we have analysed. By contrast, we find ourselves in the second situation with people like Lukács - although he is not decisive - and above all with Stalin (who was indeed decisive in opening the highway for a Marxist philosophy produced as 'philosophy'). Stalin did this by re-inflecting some unfortunate sentences of Engels's regarding 'matter and motion', etc., and by orientating Marxist philosophy towards a materialist ontology or metaphysics in which philosophical theses are realized through matter.[12] It is clear that Stalin did not possess the great circumspection of Marx, Lenin and Gramsci, and that his philosophical positions originated in his political line and terrorist practices, since it is not difficult to show that Stalinist philosophical positions are not only not foreign to the political line of Stalinism, but that they were even perfectly serviceable for it. Nor would it be difficult to show how, within the profound Stalinist crisis from which we are scarcely now beginning to recover, Stalin's philosophical positions started Marxist 'philosophy' on its way.
    Thus it is as if the history of the Marxist workers' movement, at a point that is still obscure, had experimentally vindicated Marx, Lenin and Gramsci, contradicting Plekhanov, Bogdanov, and especially Stalin. It is as if (owing to the extreme haziness, yet great discretion, of their directly philosophical interventions, together with their constant practice of a philosophy that they never wanted to write), Marx, Lenin and Gramsci had suggested that the philosophy required by Marxism was by no means a philosophy produced as 'philosophy', but rather a new practice of philosophy.
    In order to understand what lies at the root of this, we may start from Marx's contrast, in the Postface to the second German edition of Capital between two conceptions of the dialectic. In the first conception, the dialectic serves - and I quote - 'to glorify the existing order of things'; hence it involves an apologia for the dominant class. In the second, the dialectic is 'critical and revolutionary'.[13] It is this latter conception alone

 
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which is capable of serving the proletariat. To simplify, one could say that it is correct to think that Stalin regressed to the first conception and that, in order to avoid this peril, Marx steadfastly held to the second and never wrote philosophy as 'philosophy'.
    Marx manifestly considered that to produce philosophy as 'philosophy' was a way of entering into the adversary's game; that even in an oppositional form it meant playing by the rules of hegemony and contributing, indirectly, to a confrontation with bourgeois ideology which accepts the validity of its form of philosophical expression; that to dress up proletarian ideology in forms demanded by the question of bourgeois ideological hegemony was to compromise the future - and thus the present - of proletarian ideology; and finally, that it was to risk succumbing, within philosophy, to the party of the State.
    Because the history of the relations between philosophy and the State is, as the philosopher Paul Nizan likewise saw,[14] a long history. I referred to this when I alluded to the question of the dominant ideology. The dominant ideology is the ideology of the dominant class, therefore of the class which holds State power. From Plato to Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel and even Husserl, philosophy is obsessed by the question of the State, generally in the form of a nostalgic call by the philosopher to the State that it might see fit to listen to him - when it is not in the form of a dream of the philosopher as Head of State.
    By contrast, with a very sure political instinct, Marx clearly understood the political and philosophical significance of the question of the State. He not only thought about the existing bourgeois State (of which Dietzgen - with Lenin's approval - said, in words famous for their severity, that philosophy professors were its flunkeys).[15] He not only thought about the bourgeois State, 'the first ideological power', in Engels's words, capable of imposing the form of its ideology on all philosophical production. Marx saw much further. He thought about the form of the future State, the one which it would be necessary to construct after the Revolution, of which the experience of the Commune had given him a first idea and which had to be, not a State but a 'community' or (as Engels put it) 'no longer a State in the proper sense of the word'.[16] In short: a totally new form that would induce its own disappearance, its own extinction. Naturally, this strategic viewpoint of

 
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Marx's, which entirely subverted the conventional conception of the State (which is still in evidence today) was no chimera, but rested upon one of his profound convictions: that the proletariat, as it had been produced and concentrated by the capitalist mode of production, as it was educated by its great class struggles, possessed capacities that were totally foreign to the bourgeois world - above all, the ability to invent mass-based forms of organization, such as the Paris Commune and the Soviets of 1905 and 1917, which are a good example of forms of organization that enable the proletariat to exist at the margin of the State. Of course, Marx's strategic vision, which foresaw the destruction of the State, encompassed the whole superstructure, including the ideologies (and thus the dominant ideology, quite inseparable from the State). It is quite possible that Marx always had the same distrust of philosophy and the State (for the reasons that connect traditional philosophy with the State and caused him to foresee the abolition of the State). In no way did this involve an anarchist rejection of the State, despite certain affinities between Marx and the anarchists; nor, by the same token, did it involve a rejection of philosophy. On the contrary, it involved a profound mistrust of an institution - the State - and a form of unification of the dominant ideology - philosophy - which appeared to Marx to be profoundly linked, in so far as both are involved in the same mechanism of bourgeois class domination. For my part, I believe that this is why Marx abstained from all philosophy produced as 'philosophy': in order not to fall into the 'glorification of the existing order of things'.
    If this is true, Marx has bequeathed Marxists (cruelly instructed by the counter-experience of Stalinist ontology) an especially difficult undertaking. Just as he left the workers' movement with the task of inventing new forms of 'commune' that would convert the State into something superfluous, so Marx left Marxist philosophers with the task of inventing new forms of philosophical intervention to hasten the end of bourgeois ideological hegemony. In sum: the task of inventing a new practice of philosophy.
    To support our argument by comparison with the revolutionary State, which ought to be a State that is a 'non-State' - that is, a State tending to its own dissolution, to be replaced by forms of free association - one might equally say that the philosophy which obsessed Marx, Lenin and Gramsci ought to be a 'non-philosophy' - that is, one which ceases to be produced in the form of a philosophy, whose function of theoretical hegemony will disappear in order to make way for new forms of philosophical existence. And just as the free association of workers ought, according to Marx, to replace the State so as to play a totally different role from that of the State (not one of violence and repression),

 
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so it can be said that the new forms of philosophical existence linked to the future of these free associations will cease to have as their essential function the constitution of the dominant ideology, with all the compromises and exploitation that accompany it, in order to promote the liberation and free exercise of social practices and human ideas.
    And as with the perspectives on the State, the task assigned Marxist philosophy is not one for the distant future. It is an undertaking for the present, for which Marxists ought to be prepared. Marx was the first to show us the way by putting philosophy into practice in a new and disconcerting form, refusing to produce a philosophy as 'philosophy' but practising it in his political, critical and scientific work - in short, inaugurating a new, 'critical and revolutionary' relation between philosophy and the social practices, which are at one and the same time the stakes and the privileged site of class struggle. This new practice of philosophy serves the proletarian class struggle without imposing upon it an oppressive ideological unity (we know where that oppression has its roots), but rather creating for it the ideological conditions for the liberation and free development of social practices.
 

 
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Can we, 130 years after the Communist Manifesto and 110 years after Capital, outline something like a balance sheet of what is called 'Marxism'? Certainly, for we have not only a historical perspective on Marxism but the long experience of its victories, defeats and tragedies. Perhaps, too, because we are henceforth living within a crisis, within its crisis - a situation conducive to dispelling all illusions and concentrating minds on the pitiless test of reality.
    Today, then, what can we retain of Marx that is essential, and has possibly not always been understood?
    There is, first of all, one simple fact: Marx said that he was 'not a Marxist'.[1] This remark, which has been taken as the quip of a free spirit who required readers to 'think for themselves',[2] actually carries great weight. Marx was not only protesting in advance against the interpretation of his work as a system, as a new philosophy of history, or as the finally discovered science of political economy - an oeuvre with the unity of a total theory ('Marxism') produced by an 'author' (Marx). Marx was not only rejecting this pretension in declaring Capital not 'science' but 'critique of political economy'.[3] But in so doing he was changing the very meaning of the term 'criticism' or 'critique'. Upon this notion - charged with delivering the true from the false, or denouncing the false in the name of the true, by the rationalist tradition - Marx was imposing an entirely different mission, founded on the class struggle : 'such a critique represents one class . . . the proletariat'.[4] And with these words, he rejected the idea that he might, in the traditional sense, be the intellectual 'author' of such a critique.
    These reflections return us to another fact: it was within the working-class movement - by participating in its practice, its hopes, and its struggles - that the thought of Marx and Engels changed fundamentally, became 'critical and revolutionary'.[5] This is not just a simple point in the history of ideas. In the history of Marxism it has become the stake of

crucially significant theoretico-political debates. When, in the full bloom of German Social-Democracy (1902), Kautsky affirmed that Marxist theory had been produced by the 'bourgeois intelligentsia', the sole guardians of 'science', and 'introduced into the proletarian class struggle from without'; when, in an entirely different context (the struggle against 'economism'), even Lenin picked up Kautsky's formulation,[6] they were implicating Marx's thought in the most questionable kind of interpretation. A formulation is only a formulation. But it can crystallize a political tendency, as well as justify and reinforce certain historical practices. Behind this view of a scientific theory produced by bourgeois intellectuals, and 'introduced . . . from without' into the working-class movement, lies a whole conception of the relations between theory and practice, between the Party and the mass movement, and between party leaders and simple militants, which reproduces bourgeois forms of knowledge and power in their separation.
    There is no question that Marx and Engels were academically trained bourgeois intellectuals, but origin is not necessarily destiny. The real destiny that defined Marx and Engels in their historical role as intellectuals of the working class was played out in their direct experience - Marx's experience of the political struggles of Communist and socialist organizations in France, and Engels's experience of working-class exploitation and Chartism in England. The stages of their progressive commitment can be tracked in the contradictions of their 'early works'; and we can even locate the 'moment' - after the dramatic confrontation of philosophy and political economy in the 1844 Manuscripts - of their 'consciousness' of the need radically to question the principles of their formation, to think in an entirely different way, to 'change terrain' and, in order so to do, to 'settle accounts with [their] former philosophical conscience'.[7] This 'moment' begins to take shape in the striking, enigmatic sentences on the Theses on Feuerbach (1845) - only the first stage in an endless research that continued, after the political struggles of 1848-49, in The Class Struggles in France (1850), The Eighteenth Brumaire (1852), A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859), the foundation of the First International (1864), then in Capital itself (1867) and in The Civil War in France (1871). We can respond to Kautsky's formula as follows: Marx's thought was formed and developed inside the working-class movement, on the basis of that movement and its positions. It was from within the working-class movement,

 
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paying its way through struggles and contradictions, that Marx's thought was diffused from the first Marxist circles to the great mass parties.
    We find the same dubious interpretation in Engels's famous thesis, systematically repeated by Kautsky and invoked by Lenin, of the 'three sources' of Marxism.[8] Marx and Engels were indeed among those intellectuals informed by German philosophy, English political economy, and French socialism (our 'three sources'). To reduce Marx's thought to the confluence of these three currents, however, is to succumb to the platitude of a history of ideas, incapable of accounting for the politico-theoretical foundation that forced this encounter and transformed it into a 'revolutionary critique' of its elements. Hegel, Smith and Ricardo, Proudhon, etc., certainly constituted Marx's historical horizon - which he could not ignore, from which he had to begin - and were the raw material upon which he was obliged to work - but in order to penetrate its ideological facade, to shake up its principles, to perceive its other side, its hidden reality. To get to the other side is precisely to 'change terrain' and to adopt another position - a 'critique [that] represents . . . the proletariat'. To reduce the history of this revolution in thought to the simple confluence of 'three sources' is ultimately to see Marx as an 'author' who knew how to combine the elements that converged in him - for example, to make a 'metaphysics of political economy' by applying Hegel to Ricardo. It is to see Marx as putting each of these three elements 'on its feet' with their structures intact - constituting political economy as a science, philosophy as dialectical materialism, and the visions of French socialism as a 'materialist' philosophy of history or - the practical version of this messianism - as a scientific socialism.
    We know that these formulae, in this finished form, are not to be found in Marx. Rather, they belong to the history of Marxism, where, from the Second International onwards, they represented the official definition of Marxism: dialectical materialism, historical materialism, scientific socialism. Nevertheless we do find in Marx, who battled within the contradiction of having to think something which had no name, elements that license the appearance of these formulae. We find the (Feuerbachian) theme of the 'inversion' of Hegelian philosophy, of putting the Hegelian dialectic 'back on its feet'.[9] We do find - increasingly criticized yet always present as a motif - the idea of a philosophy

 
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of history, of a meaning of history embodied in the succession of 'progressive epochs' of determinate modes of production, leading to the transparence of Communism.[10] We find in Marx this idealist representation of the 'realm of freedom' succeeding the 'realm of necessity'[11] - the myth of a community wherein the 'free development' of individuals takes the place of social relations, which become as superfluous as the State and commodity relations.
    The latent or manifest idealism of these themes haunts not only The German Ideology (a veritable 'materialist' philosophy of history) but also the evolutionism of the 1859 Preface (the 'progressive' succession of modes of production) and the tautological finalism of the famous sentences that delighted Gramsci: 'No social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed. . . . Mankind thus inevitably sets itself only such tasks as it is able to solve'.[12] In an infinitely more subtle form, the same idealism haunts Capital itself. We have learned to recognize in Capital's 'mode of exposition', however impressive, the fictive unity imposed upon it from the outset by the requirement of beginning with the abstraction of value - i.e. with the homogeneity presupposed by the field of commensurability - without having previously posited capitalist relations of exploitation as the condition of its process.[13]
    If the question of the 'beginning' represented a burden for Marx ('Beginnings are always difficult in all sciences'[14]); if he imposed on himself the idea of a mandatory starting point with the ultimate abstraction of value, this was also a function of a certain conception of science [Wissenschaft ] - that is, a conception of the formal conditions to which every thought process [Denkprozess ] must submit in order to be true (e.g. that all knowledge, and hence its exposition, must proceed from the abstract to the concrete). Clearly, Hegel is still present in this illusion of the necessary presentation [Darstellung ], or exposition, of the True.
    The effects of this philosophical conception of the formation of True thought can be located at precise points in Capital : for example, in the arithmetical presentation of surplus-value as the difference between the

value produced and the variable capital advanced in the process of production.[15] Imposed in this form by deduction from the order of exposition, this presentation can lead to an economistic interpretation of exploitation. Exploitation, however, cannot be reduced to this surplus-value, but must be thought in its concrete forms and conditions. That is to say, it must be thought within the implacable constraints of the labour process (extension, intensification, compartmentalization) and the division and discipline of the organization of labour, on the one hand; and the conditions of the reproduction of the labour force (consumption, housing, family, education, health, questions of women, etc.), on the other. Undoubtedly, Marx did not identify exploitation solely with the arithmetical subtraction of value. He speaks of the various forms of surplus-value (absolute, relative), just as he speaks of forms of exploitation in the labour process and in the reproduction of labour-power. But he does this in chapters that have always appeared strange, 'historical' and 'concrete' rather than abstract, and on the margin of the dominant mode of exposition[16] - as if he had to break off or interrupt this mode in order to impart its meaning to it!
    Many other examples of difficulties and contradictions might be given where Marx gets caught in the self-imposed trap of commencing with the abstraction of value. To cite just two: the thorny question of the preservation/transference of the value of the means of production in their operation by labour-power; or the question of the transformation of values into prices of production, where Marx is caught in a faulty line of reasoning - as if one did not have to go back even further to understand the point.[17]
    So we see: however consciously posed, the obvious need to 'change terrain', to adopt a position that 'represents . . . the proletariat', did not in itself serve from the outset 'to settle accounts with our former philosophical conscience'. The materialism advocated by Marx also applies to him: consciousness is not practice; consciousness is not even thought in its real forms. We might note as a sign of this unavoidable gap the fact that apart from the brief, enigmatic proclamation of the Theses on Feuerbach, Marx himself would never clearly explain his new

positions on 'his' philosophy. He had promised Engels a dozen pages on the dialectic; he never wrote them. And he 'omitted' the 1857 Introduction - the most elaborated statement of his position - saying: 'it seems to me confusing to anticipate results which still have to be substantiated'.[18] Everything happened in his work and in his struggle: an interminable struggle to insure the new positions against the return of the old - a battle that was always in doubt, even when it seemed won; a struggle to find words that do not yet exist in order to think what was concealed by some omnipotent words. (The struggle is also fought over words.) Witness the most profound hesitations in Capital, where 'alienation' continues to haunt the text in the theory of fetishism, the opposition between dead and living labour, the domination of the conditions of production over the worker, and the figure of Communism. Alienation: an old word, an old, all-purpose, idealist concept, manifestly there to think something else - something which is unthought, and has remained so.
    Here is another example of how history, in good materialist fashion, surprised and overtook Marx. Marx is distinguished from all idealist political philosophy in that he never entertained any illusions about the 'omnipotence of ideas', his own included. (It was Lenin who, in the heat of polemic, unwisely wrote that 'the Marxist doctrine is omnipotent because it is true'.[19]) From the Manifesto onwards, Marx's position is clear and was never to change: it is the general movement of the class struggle of the proletariat against the capitalists that will open the path to Communism as a 'real movement'.[20] The influence of ideas is only the secondary expression of a balance of class forces.
    The extraordinary thing is that Marx takes account of this materialist thesis in the position of his own ideas. This is clear in the Manifesto as well as the 1859 Preface, where the exposition takes the form of a topography. Thus Marx expounds his own ideas twice, in two very different forms. He first presents them as principles of comprehensive analysis (whether of a global conjuncture, as in the Manifesto, or of the structure of a social formation, as in the 1859 Preface). His ideas are thus present - and present in their theoretical form - everywhere, since they are the means of explaining a global reality. But Marx's ideas make a second appearance, when he situates them in a position determined and limited by this global reality - in the formula of the 1859 Preface, among the 'ideological forms in which men become conscious of [class]

conflict and fight it out'.[21] In thus situating his ideas in a (superstructural) position defined by social and class relations, Marx no longer considers them as principles of explanation of the given whole, but solely in terms of their possible effect in the ideological struggle. Therewith the ideas change their form; they pass from 'theoretical form' to 'ideological form'.
    The measure of Marx's materialism is less the materialist content of his theory than the acute, practical consciousness of the conditions, forms and limits within which these ideas can become active. Hence their double inscription in the topography. Hence the essential thesis that ideas, no matter how true and formally proven, can never be historically active in person but only in the form of a mass ideology, adopted in the class struggle.
    Yet by an incredible historical irony, Marx was not in a position to conceive the possibility that his own thought might itself be diverted to serve the ends of the 'omnipotence of ideas' and used as its politics. It is not a question of putting Marx on trial here and judging him on the basis of something other than his own history, upon which we must reflect. Still, we may note one piece of evidence: in all that Marx left us, there is very little concerning what he called the 'superstructure' - meaning law, the State, and 'ideological forms'. And until Gramsci (whose contribution remains limited) the Marxist tradition added nothing to what Marx left us. Moreover, it is a surprising paradox that from a theoretical point of view Marxism is still at the stage of Marx, or rather somewhere short of him. His thought has given rise to commentaries and illustrations (sometimes brilliant, most often dull) and to some applications, and it has of course been plunged into sharp conflicts of interpretation in the course of revolutionary political action. Yet for the most part Marxism has been repeated, and distorted or ossified in the process. This is an astonishing phenomenon, given that Marxism presented itself not as utopian but as scientific, and that no science in the world lives without progressing - progress which involves critically questioning its first forms of expression, its 'beginning'. Nothing of the sort occurred in the case of Marxism: only Rosa Luxemburg had the courage to attempt a critique of the reproduction schemas in Volume 2 of Capital,[22] but that was erroneous. Up until recent years, when a movement of critical research finally seems to be taking shape, Marxist theory has never been recommenced or developed. Now, this paradox refers us not only to the incontestable effects of the class struggle and the domination of bourgeois

 
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not hesitate to affirm that 'the Marxist doctrine is omnipotent because it is true', and that 'Marxism is cast in a block of steel'. Of course, we must remember the context in which these statements were made, and realize that Lenin deliberately 'bent the stick' in the other direction;[26] but history transforms the context, while the words remain. Marxism was turned into an evolutionist philosophy of history (Kautsky, Plekhanov), Capital into a treatise on political economy. To fix the unity of this enterprise, some unfortunate texts of Engels's (like Ludwig Feuerbach or the Dialectics of Nature) were utilized to construct 'the' Marxist philosophy - dialectical materialism - which Lenin, conferring an absolute guarantee, declared 'the only wholly consistent philosophy'. At the end of this line of development, Marxism became a philosophy (dialectical materialism) of which historical materialism was an 'integral part' and scientific socialism the application. In Marx's name, for years and years Stalin fixed the formulae of this poor man's Hegelianism,[27] this Absolute Knowledge without exterior, from which any topography had disappeared - and for good reason. Since 'the cadres decide everything',[28] the definition of the True was the prerogative of the leaders, the bourgeois ideology of the omnipotence of ideas triumphed in the monstrous unity of State-Party-State ideology, the masses had only to submit in the very name of their liberation.
    The influence of bourgeois ideology on the working-class movement is insufficient to account for this enormous distortion; the reproduction of its forms within the workers' movement must also be explained. Here a theory of ideology - not only in relation to the State, to its material existence in certain apparatuses, but also in relation to the Party itself - is indispensable. Marxist leaders have always been sensitive to the influence of (dominant) bourgeois ideology on political tendencies within the working-class movement. Yet they always conceived it mechanically, and invariably ultimately identified it as the sole cause of all the movement's difficulties and 'deviations'. This influence alone. Engaged in and blinded by the practical, immediate problems of the class struggle, these leaders were not advised that any organization of struggle secretes a specific ideology designed to defend and ensure its own unity. If they did indeed recognize that Marxist theory had to find mass-based 'ideological forms' in order to become politically active, they did not really take into account the fact of the difference and potential

 
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contradiction between Marxist ideology and the ideology required for the existence, unity and defence of the organization. Lacking a theory of the Party, and of the effects produced by the structure of its apparatus, they could not conceive that Marxist ideology might be deformed by the ideology necessary for the Party as such. The latter prerequisite is reflected in Lenin's formulae on the 'omnipotence' and 'steel block' of Marxism. For the Party to be unified in its organizational practice, certain of its cause and its future in a critical period, nothing less than the proclaimed guarantee of the Truth of its ideology, and of the unfailing unity of its theory and its practice, was demanded. And since the Party is an apparatus, there was a great temptation for the leadership to attribute to itself the ideological guarantee of a kind of Absolute Knowledge, to the point of no longer perceiving the ideological function of this knowledge, confused with its power, and hence its risks - even to the extent of not realizing that this unrecognized function of ideology could end up reproducing in the Party itself, in the difference between its leaders and its militants, the structure of the bourgeois State.[29]
    Yet in order to perceive that the acknowledged influence of bourgeois ideology on the working-class movement is not simply a matter of 'ideas' or of 'tendencies' but is also reflected in the materiality of organizational structures that tend to reproduce the structure of the State, a materialist theory of ideology, of the State, of the Party, and of politics would have been required. In the practice of its organizations, Marxism has constantly encountered these realities: it has had to resolve the problems posed by them, but gropingly and as if blind. This constitutes the grandeur and pathos of Lenin's work and action: that he was acutely aware of the existence of these questions and did not cease to rectify and change his thinking when confronted with the gigantic task of founding a new party and a new State, and to involve the masses in the ideological renewal of a cultural revolution. Lenin's prodigious experience in the practice of revolution as a long and contradictory process is indeed a corrective to the mythic notion of it as a total and immediate mutation, but does not lead to a theory of State, ideology and Party. This constitutes the grandeur and pathos of Gramsci: to have sensed the importance and political weight of these questions, but without being able to extricate himself from a historical research still caught up in a philosophy of history. This is what constitutes the grandeur of Mao: that he practically questioned the metaphysical idea of

    30. Prison Notebooks, London 1971, p. 323. [Ed.]
 

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Althusser, Louis   'Avant-Propos' 272 n13   'Contradiction and     Overdetermination' 149 n2, 218     n14   Elements of Self-Criticism     211, 216 n12, 224 n16, 226   For Marx 71, 204 n1, 205-40     passim, 271 n9   'Freud and Lacan' 180 n14   'Ideology and Ideological State     Apparatuses' 238 n39, 256 n9,     257 n10, 276 n24   'Lenin and Philosophy' 263 n15   'Lenin before Hegel' 198 n29   'Marxism and Humanism' 231 n32   'Marx's Relation to Hegel' 216 n12	'On the Materialist Dialectic'     218 n14, 222, 226 n20   'Montesquieu: Politics and History'     204 n1, 205   'Note on the ISAs' 238 n39   Philosophy and the Spontaneous     Philosophy of the Scientists 253   Reading Capital 58 n10, 60 n11,     71, 204 n1, 205-40 passim   'Remark on the Category: "Process     without a Subject or Goal(s)"'     249 n2   'What Must Change in the Party'     278 n29   'On the Young Marx' 207 Alain (Émile Auguste Chartier) 249 Aquinas, St Thomas 102-3
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Archimedes 220 Aristotle 124, 128, 157, 245, 249 Avenarius, Richard 114 Bachelard, Gaston 88, 173, 179, 226   La Formation de l'esprit     scientifique 88 n3   Le Rationalisme applique 179 n13 Badiou, Alain 71   Le Concept de modele 27, 71 Balibar, Etienne 71   Reading Capital 54 n8 Bazarov, V.A. 170 Bebel, August 263 n16 Bergson, Henri 111, 123-4, 172   Laughter 76   Matter and Memory 124   The Two Sources of Morality and     Religion 124 Berkeley, George 186, 189, 192, 249,   250 n3 Bloch, Joseph 214 Bogdanov, A.A. 114, 170, 189, 262 Borel, Émile 110 Boutroux, Émile 172 Brunschvicg, Léon 111, 124-5, 126,   172   Le Progr�s de la conscience dans la     philosophie occidentale 124 n4 Canguilhem, Georges 66   Études d 'histoire et de philosophie     dessciences 66 n15 Cantor, Georg 110 Carnot, Nicolas Leonard Sadi 190	Cartan, Henri 157 Cavaillès, Jean 173 Darwin, Charles 150,180 Della Volpe, Galvano 212 Descartes, René 8, 10, 11, 103,     123, 124, 125, 126-7,     182, 183, 206, 216, 252,     253, 247, 250, 263   Meditations on the First     Philosophy 127 n7 Diderot, Denis 186, 189, 192,     193 Dietzgen, Joseph 173-4, 192,   201, 263   Das Wesen der menschlichen     Kopfarbeit 174 n6 Duhamel, Georges 123   Civilisation 123 n1 Duhem, Pierre 170, 172 Dühring, Eugen 11, 178 Durkheim, Émile 173 Engels, Friedrich 3, 5, 8, 11, 12,   15, 16, 17, 31, 33, 48, 60, 64,   157, 172, 173, 175, 178, 184,   185, 190, 192,194, 195, 199,   200, 213, 214, 222, 247, 261,   262, 263, 269-71, 274   Anti-Dühring 8, 17 n13, 60,     178, 181, 183, 246   Dialectics of Nature 60, 181,     230 n29, 262 n12, 277   Ludwig Feuerbach 8, 174 n6,     190
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n23, 191, 192 n25, 194 n27,     251, 277   The Origin of the Family 182 n16   Socialism: Utopian and Scientific 3 n1 Epicurus 154, 216, 217, 261 Ferry, Jules 94 Feuerbach, Ludwig 67, 231-4   The Essence of Christianity 232 n35   'The Essence of Christianity in     Relation to The Ego and its     Own' 233 n36   Manifestes philosophiques 204 n1   'Preliminary Theses on the Reform     of Philosophy' 231 n33   'Principles of the Philosophy of the     Future' 233 n36 Fichant, Michel 71   L'Idée d 'une histoire des sciences      71 Fichte, J. G. 124, 125 Fourastie, Jean 81 Fourier, François Charles Marie 3, 31 Frege, Gottlob 173 Freud, Sigmund 173, 180, 200 Galileo Galilei 10, 66, 180, 250 Garaudy, Roger 125   Karl Marx - The Evolution of his     Thought 125 n6 Glucksmann, André   The Master Thinkers 251 n4 Gorky, Maxim 169, 171, 202 Gramsci, Antonio 93, 178, 184, 249,   257, 258, 262, 264, 272, 275,   278   Prison Notebooks 280 n30 Grotius, Hugo 173 Hadamard, Jacques Salomon 110 Hamelin, Octave 172 Hegel, G. W. F. 8, 11, 80, 103, 114,   124, 152, 154, 157, 173, 189, 192,   197-8, 206, 214, 215, 216-23	passim, 224, 226, 228, 234, 244,   245, 246, 247, 249, 250, 252,   253, 263, 271, 272   Lectures on the History of     Philosophy 152 n3   Phenomenology of Spirit 152 n3,     154   Philosophy of History 219   Philosophy of Right 182, 219 Heidegger, Martin 192, 199, 243 Hobbes, Thomas 173, 206 Hume, David 193   Enquiry Concerning Human     Understanding 250 n3 Husserl, Edmund 8, 10, 11, 123, 125,   126-7, 128, 129, 173, 182, 188,   199, 243, 244, 245, 263   Ideas 127 n9   The Crisis of the European Sciences     129 n1O Hyppolite, Jean 173 n5, 205 Jankelevitch, Vladimir 205 Kant, Immanuel 8, 10, 11, 75, 80,   89, 103, 111, 114, 116-17, 123,   124, 125, 126-7, 129, 135, 157,   173, 182, 187, 189, 193, 195,   198-9, 205, 206, 216, 244, 247,   250, 251, 252, 253, 263   Critique of Pure Reason 89 n4, 116     n3, 127 n8, 193 n26, 255 n7   Metaphysical Foundations of     Natural Science 126-7 Kautsky, Karl 31, 270, 271, 277 Krupskaya, Nadezhda Konstantinovna   94 Labriola, Antonio 178 Lachelier, Jules 172 Lavoisier, Antoine Laurent 180 Le Besgue, V. A. 110 Lefebvre, Henri   La Pensée de Lénine 172 n3
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Leibniz, G. W. 10, 11 Lenin, V. I. 6, 8, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17,   18, 19, 20, 31, 32, 40, 48, 51, 60,   64-5, 67, 75, 103, 104-5, 115,   117, 125, 130-31, 142, 169-202   passim, 208-10, 211, 218, 224-5,   228-9, 230, 240, 247, 261, 262,   263, 264, 270, 271, 276-7, 278,   280   'April Theses' 105   The Development of Capitalism in     Russia 54,181,189   Imperialism, Highest Stage of     Capitalism 181   'Kommunismus' 229 n28   Materialism and Empirio-criticism     8, 11, 12 n6, 13, 19, 60, 115     n2, 117, 173-4, 175, 184,     186-201 passim, 228-9, 230,     246   'Our Programme' 4-5, 17-18, 60     n12, 230 n31   Philosophical Notebooks 8, 183 n18,     189, 192, 198 n29, 213 n8,     225 n18, 247   State and Revolution 6, 182   'The Three Sources and     Component Parts of Marxism'     208-9, 271 n8, 274   What is to be Done? 5 n4,16 n11,     185, 190 n21 & n22, 209-10,     222 n15 Lévi-Strauss, Claude 195   The Raw and the Cooked 195 n28 Lichnerowitz, André   Mathematical Activity and its Role     in our Conception of the World     157 Locke, John 173, 206 Lukacs, Georg 184, 223, 262 Lunacharsky, Anatoly 170 Luxemburg, Rosa 276   The Accumulation of Capital 275   'Organizational Questions of Russian     Social-Democracy' 276 n23   'The Russian Revolution' 276 n23 Mach, Ernst 11,113,114, 169-70,	192 Macherey, Pierre 71 Machiavelli, Niccolo 173,   206, 209, 257, 261 Maine de Biran (Marie François   Pierre Gontier de Biran) 172 Malthus,Thomas 151 Mao Tse-tung 262, 278-9 Marcel, Gabriel 125 Marx Karl 3, 5-17 passim, 21-3,   25, 27, 30-35, 37-9, 45-7, 49,   52, 55, 56-62, 64-6, 112, 125,   130-31, 142, 173, 175, 177-   84, 200, 202, 205-40 passim,   246-8, 251, 254, 255-65   passim, 269-80 passim   Capital 6-7, 15 n10, 16, 34, 40,     48, 50, 52-4, 57-9, 60-62,     66, 149 n2, 179, 181, 183     189, 192 n25, 212-14, 217     n13, 218, 220-22, 224-5,     226 n20, 230, 235-40, 246-     8, 260-62, 269-70, 271     n9, 272-4, 277   The Civil War in France 263 n16   Class Struggles in France 46, 270   Communist Manifesto 30 n18, 57,     181, 202, 221, 269, 274   'Contribution to the Critique of     Hegel's Philosophy of Right' 27     n17, 232 n34   Contribution to the Critique of     Political Economy 57, 181, 205,     270   'Critique of the Gotha Programme'     6, 235-6   Economic and Philosophical     Manuscripts 61, 62, 270   The Eighteenth Brumaire 46, 54,     270   The German Ideology 7, 57, 58,     178-9, 180, 194, 202, 212,     246, 272   Grundrisse 235   1857 Introduction 8, 46 n1, 47,     213, 225-8, 239, 274   'Marginal Notes on Adolph     Wagner's Lehrbuch der
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politischen Ökonomie' 235   The Poverty of Philosophy 8, 57,     181   1859 Preface 23 n16, 178 n9, 213,     221, 255-6, 270, 272, 274-5   Theses on Feuerbach 7, 178-9,     180, 181, 183-4, 200-1, 246,     247-8, 261, 270, 273   Wages, Price, and Profit 15 n9, 181 Maurras, Charles 112 n1 Mendel, Gregor Johann 180 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice   Adventures of the Dialectic 172 Monod, Jacques 71, 134 n12, 138,   145-65 passim   Chance and Necessity 145 n1 Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat   baron de le Brède et de 205, 206,   219 Newton, Isaac 10, 182 Nietzsche, Friedrich 157, 158, 250 Nizan, Paul 263   The Watchdogs 263 n14 Ostwald, Wolfgang 113, 114 Owen, Robert 3, 31 Pascal, Blaise 111, 112, 121 Pêcheux, Michel 71   Sur l'Histoire des sciences 71 Plato 10, 11, 75, 76, 80, 103, 115,   124, 128,182, 183, 198,199,   243-5, 247-51 passim, 263 Plekhanov, G. V. 262, 277 Poincaré, Henri 170, 172 Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph 3, 31, 271 Ravaisson-Mollieu, Félix Lacher 172 Regnault, François 71	Rey, Abel 170, 172 Ricardo, David 271 Ricoeur, Paul172, 195   Freud and Philosophy 125 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 173, 206,   222, 226, 251   Discourse on the Origin of     Inequality 144, 205, 222 Roy, Joseph 271 n9 Russell, Bertrand 173 Sartre, Jean-Paul 158, 172   'Materialism and Revolution' 172 n4   Words 156-7 Schelling, F. W. J. 152 Shakespeare, William 155 Smith, Adam 271 Socrates 249 Spinoza, Baruch de 39, 124, 173,   206, 213, 216, 217, 224-8,   234, 244, 252, 253, 263   Ethics 216   On the Improvement of the     Understanding 224, 228 n26   Theological-Political Treatise 216,     224 Stalin, J. V. 155, 262, 263, 277   Dialectical and Historical     Materialism 53, 262, 277 n28   Problems of Leninism 65, 277 n28 Teilhard de Chardin, Pierre 81, 111,   121, 148, 150, 153, 156, 157,   158, 162 Thales 76, 180 Wahl, Jean 169 n1 Wittgenstein, Ludwig 243 Zermelo, Ernst 110